Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance by Belinfanti, Tamara
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
2014
Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance
Tamara Belinfanti
New York Law School, tamara.belinfanti@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
38 Del. J. Corp. L. 789 (2013-2014)
SHAREHOLDER CULTIVATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE
BY TAMARA C. BELINFANTI*
ABSTRACT
Several formal proposals have been made to address shareholder
short-termism and speculative behavior. These include the imposition of
a financial transaction tax, changes to the U.S. capital gains tax rate,
and the adoption of an Investor Stewardship Code in the United
Kingdom. This Article reverses the focus from top-down solutions and
instead, focuses on bottom-up grass root solutions that corporations can
employ, and in some cases do already employ to achieve substantially
the same effect of rewarding certain types of shareholder behavior while
discouraging others-a process I refer to as "Shareholder Cultivation."
While many of the techniques and strategies discussed in this Article are
not new and in fact many have been used by companies and investor
relation professionals for years, the Article is the first to conceptualize a
prescriptive framework for assessing which techniques and strategies
should be allowed. Additionally, the Article utilizes new governance
theory to examine the concept of Shareholder Cultivation with a fresh
lens: as a corporate governance benefit.
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President of G.A. Kraut Company Inc.; Brian Walsh, Executive Director of Liquidnet For
Good; and Marjorie Kelly, author of Owning Our Future: The Emerging Ownership
Revolution, for their selfless and valuable feedback. Special thanks for the useful comments
received from attendees at the Emerging Approaches to Corporate Governance session at the
2013 Law & Society annual meeting and fellow members of the New York Areas Scholars
Group. Jennifer Wang provided truly exceptional research assistance. Finally, special and
(ironic?) thanks to the "cultivated" shareholder who told me "corporate governance is
b***s**t; if companies really want governance they go out and get people like me to help hold
the ship steady." And from that, this Article began.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2012 article in the Harvard Business Review, the authors
asked: "What good are shareholders?"' The traditional response to this
question is that shareholders are the owners of the firm, they contribute
financial capital, in addition to which they serve a monitoring and
disciplining function that in theory controls managerial shirking.2 Post
2008, however, there has been an intense focus on the role of
shareholders in the 2008 financial crisis and a recognition that short-
termistic speculative behavior played a key role in the global financial
market demise.' As a result, several formal proposals have been made to
address these short-termistic and speculative tendencies.' These include
the imposition of a financial transaction tax, changes to the United States
("U.S.") capital gains tax rate, and the adoption of an Investor
Stewardship Code in the United Kingdom ("UK").'
'See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 2012.
2See id
'See infra Part II.
4See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
5See France Wants Changes to EU Financial Transaction Tax, REUTERS:
UK EDITION (July 11, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/l1/france-tax-eu-
idUKL6NOFH2I320130711; JOHN C. BOGLE ET AL., ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING
SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT
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While these formal proposals have tremendous merit, this Article
reverses the focus from looking to top-down solutions, and instead,
focuses on bottom-up grass root solutions that corporations can employ,
and in some cases do already employ, to achieve substantially the same
effect of rewarding certain types of shareholder behavior while
discouraging others-a process I refer to as "Shareholder Cultivation."
As more fully developed herein, the aim of Shareholder Cultivation is to
identify, attract, and cultivate a core of committed shareholders stewards
who understand the firm's purpose and value proposition, rather than
settling for a shareholder base composed entirely of "faceless members
of an ever-shifting crowd."' While many of the techniques and strategies
discussed herein are not new, and in fact many have been used by
companies and investor relation professionals for years, the Article is the
first to conceptualize a prescriptive framework for assessing which
techniques and strategies should be allowed. Additionally, the Article
utilizes new governance theory to examine the concept of Shareholder
Cultivation with a fresh lens: as a corporate governance benefit.'
For public corporations that care about developing and achieving
long-term value, Shareholder Cultivation will become increasingly
important. As a leading report on the importance of stewardship argues,
"the success of companies and the societies in which they operate
depends on the exercise of 'stewardship."'"
Public corporations express this desire to cultivate shareholder
stewards in many ways.! For example, in its 2004 Owner's Manual for
AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, 2 (2009),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcomeshort state0909.p
df; The UK Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (2012),
http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e- 120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-
Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx.
6WARREN E. BUFFETT, AN OWNER'S MANUAL 1 (1996),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ownman.pdf (describing that Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
shareholders are not viewed as "faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd," but rather
potential life-long co-venturers).
'See infra Part III.
'MARK GOYDER & DONALD MACDONALD, TOMORROW'S OWNERS: STEWARDSHIP
OF TOMORROW'S COMPANY 3 (2008), http://tomorrowscompany.com/tomorrows-owners-
stewardship-of-tomorrows-company. Although the report's definition of "steward" was limited
to a shareholder who "promote[s] sustainable, long-term, performance," the larger point is that
a focus on ownership design is integral to a company's long-term success. Id.
9See, e.g., ANITA SKIPPER ET AL., INVESTOR STEWARDSHIP WORKING PARTY, 2020
STEWARDSHIP: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF INVESTOR STEWARDSHIP (2012),
https://www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/Policy2/2020_Stewardship Final L.pdf ("I believe
you get the shareholders you deserve. There are a lot of shareholders with whom you could
never have a dialogue. The.long-term investors tend to behave consistently, they're available
and they are those that tell you things as they are." (quoting the Chairman of a FTSE 100
792 [Vol. 38
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Shareholders, Google Inc.'s founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin,
included a plea to their shareholders to avoid a short-term and impatient
mindset saying,
[i]n our opinion, outside pressures too often tempt
companies to sacrifice long term opportunities to meet
quarterly market expectations.... If opportunities arise that
might cause us to sacrifice short term results but are in the
best long term interests of our shareholders, we will take
these opportunities. . . . We would request that our
shareholders take the long term view."
Similarly, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., in a letter to its shareholders, stated
that the firm tries to attract investors who "understand [its] operations,
attitudes and expectations. . . . [a]nd, fully as important, . . . dissuade
those who won't.""
Admittedly, the notion of cultivating some subset of loyal
shareholders causes intellectual unease. It raises significant concerns
such as entrenchment, abuse, diminished monitoring, creation of a class
of lapdog shareholders, and unequal treatment for shareholders not
deemed worthy of cultivation.12 The cultivation framework developed in
this Article attempts to minimize and temper these concerns and on
balance, the Article argues that any perceived costs of Shareholder
Cultivation are outweighed by the benefits of having an engaged core of
shareholder stewards."
In his article Shareholder Eugenics in Public Corporations,
Professor Edward Rock argues that there is "a link between the
shareholders of a company and its cost of capital." 4 Based on this
premise, Professor Rock investigates traditional capital market tools for
engineering the shareholder base "[firom the perspective of financial
economics."" While some of the traditional capital market tools
discussed by Professor Rock are also referenced herein, this Article is
Company in Executive Summary)).
10Google Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-I Registration Statement (Form S-I/A),
27 (Aug. 18, 2004).
"Letter from Warren E. Buffett to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Mar.
14, 1984), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1983.html.
12See infra Part V.B.
'
3 See infra Part V.B.
14Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L.
REv. 849, 851 (2012).
'
5ld
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distinct in at least two respects. First, in terms of approach, this Article
anchors Shareholder Cultivation in the new governance school, and in
doing so provides a theoretical frame for conceptualizing and assessing
Shareholder Cultivation as a corporate governance practice.'" Second,
this Article expands the frontier for future cultivation strategies and
directly connects the promise of Shareholder Cultivation to the
increasing calls for stewardship."
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II first
examines some of the practical dynamics of shareholder behavior that
have led to calls for shareholder stewardship, but at the same time make
stewardship challenging." These dynamics include an increasingly
heterogeneous and transient shareholder pool; the presence of third-party
intermediaries like proxy advisors that can change the tenor of the
relationship between a firm and its shareholder base; the increased
prevalence of activist investors; and the use of automated trading
algorithms, which make the benefits of personal outreach from
management to shareholders all the more necessary." Most of these
dynamics have not been addressed by corporate governance regulations,
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.20 Part II posits that
Shareholder Cultivation bridges the gap between top-down corporate
governance rules and the changing realities of share ownership on one
hand, and the actualization of stewardship, on the other.'
Part III employs new governance theory to unpack the corporate
governance benefits of Shareholder Cultivation and develops a
framework for assessing which cultivation techniques and strategies
should be allowed.22 The term "new governance" captures a range of
regulatory activities and processes, which challenge the conventional
wisdom that effective regulation should involve top-down regulation and
command-and-control rules, while simultaneously rejecting a complete
shift from top-down regulation towards pure market or self-regulation.23
1See infra Part III.
1See generally The UK Stewardship Code, supra note 5 (outlining principles of
effective investor stewardship in the United Kingdom); SKIPPER ET AL., supra note 9 (detailing
current challenges in investor stewardship and proposing strategies for improving stewardship
going forward).
"See infra Part II.
'
9See infra Part II.
20See infra Part II.
2 1See infra Part II.
22See infra Part Ill.
23See infra Part Ill.
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The new governance paradigm seeks to identify both regulatory failures
and market failures in a given space, and from this, devises
complementary or "third-way" approaches that address these failures and
enhance outcomes.24 Additionally, recognizing that Shareholder
Cultivation could be subject to abuse, Part III employs the Ayers-Gertner
"immutable rule-default rule" construct to develop a prescriptive
framework for determining the bounds and limits of acceptable
Shareholder Cultivation activity. 25 As developed herein, the outward
limits of cultivation would consist of immutable corporate law rules
(inviolate rules that the parties cannot contract around), such as the rule
that shareholders have a right to elect directors. 26 These immutable rules
would be off limits to cultivation experimentation, and at the risk of
stating the obvious, a violation of any of them would be considered
illegal. By contrast, all default rules of corporate law (rules that the
parties can contract around within the bounds of the rules-for example,
the rules related to quorum whereby quorum can be increased or
decreased beyond the statutory default, but in no event can it be less than
one third) would be open to experimentation up to the point that they are
limited by one or more of the immutable rules.27
Part IV transitions from theory to practice and provides a
comprehensive analysis of actual and potential Shareholder Cultivation
strategies." Specifically, Part IV develops a taxonomy of cultivation
tools and dissects the legal framework that makes deployment of these
cultivation tools possible. 29  As described in Part IV, Shareholder
Cultivation strategies can be visualized as falling along a cultivation
24 0rly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
25See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
26See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011) (permitting shareholders of a
corporation to elect its directors for staggered terms); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 603 (McKinney
2003) (providing provisions for shareholders to elect directors in the event of a failure to elect
a sufficient number of directors under normal circumstances).
27See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011), which reads in full:
[T]he certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation authorized to
issue stock may specify the number of shares and/or the amount of other
securities having voting power the holders of which shall be present or
represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for, and
the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any business ....
Id.
28See infra Part IV.
29See infra Part IV.A-F.
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spectrum." The first point on the cultivation spectrum consists of "pre-
cultivation" activities, which include the firm's articulation of its purpose
and value proposition." The second spectrum point consists of
identification tools, which assist firms in identifying potential
shareholder stewards,32 and the third point consists of "enlistment and re-
enforcement tools," which include cultivation techniques to attract and
enlist stewardship shareholders."
In addition to providing a comprehensive treatment of current
activities in which companies engage and which serve a cultivation
purpose, Part IV also proposes future Shareholder Cultivation strategies
that firms could employ to cultivate shareholder stewards.34 Among the
strategies proposed in Part IV are (i) the issuance of shares that have
superior voting rights and economic rights, and which could be issued to
targeted shareholders who commit to fulfilling certain mission-sustaining
criteria (what I term "MY Shares" or "Mission-Yield Shares"); (ii) the
implementation of a "time-weighted dividend" policy whereby the
dividends that a shareholder receives would be dependent on the length
of time that the shareholder owns stock in the company, so that long-
term shareholders would be rewarded more than short-term
shareholders;" (iii) the implementation of a "mission-weighted" dividend
policy, which would be similar to a time-weighted dividend policy,
except that the amount of dividend received would be contingent on
whether the shareholder fulfilled certain mission-sustaining criteria; (iv)
a shareholder loyalty rewards point program, whereby shareholders
could earn points based on their length of time as shareholders or on the
basis of satisfying specified mission-sustaining criteria, and such points
could be "redeemed" for additional shares or for certain products or
services produced by the firm;" (v) a transaction tax as incentive for
stewardship;" (vi) integrated reporting of financial, environmental, and
social performance;40 and (vii) within the confines of existing law, the
suspension of shareholder voting rights for the extreme case where
"oSee infra Part IV.A.
"See infra Part IV.B.
"See infra Part IV.C.
"See infra Part IV.D.
34See infra Part IV.F.
"See infra Part IV.F.1.
"See infra Part IV.F.2.
"See infra Part IV.F.3.
38See infra Part IV.F.7.
"See infra Part IV.F.6.
40See infra Part IV.F.5.
796 [Vol. 38
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shareholders abuse their status qua shareholders.4' For each of the
proposed cultivation strategies discussed, Part IV analyzes the legal
framework across state law, federal law, and stock exchange listing rules
and provides an outline for implementation.42
Part V assesses the benefits and costs of Shareholder Cultivation
both to individual firms and in the aggregate.43 Key benefits of
Shareholder Cultivation include the encouragement of stewardship
capital," enhanced thought-partnering between shareholders and
managers,45 and the use of Shareholder Cultivation as a potential anti-
takeover device." Simultaneously, however, Part V recognizes that the
arguments put forth in this Article are subject to critique, such as whether
Shareholder Cultivation will lead to entrenched interests;47 whether
Shareholder Cultivation will increase the transaction costs of share
ownership;48 suspicion about the effectiveness of Shareholder Cultivation
for a large public corporation, especially in light of the fact that most
shares are held through institutional intermediaries;49 and whether
Shareholder Cultivation runs afoul of agency theory by diminishing the
monitoring function that corporate governance wants shareholders to
serve.o Part V addresses each of these critiques in turn and demonstrates
that corporate law's existing package of immutable rules and default rules
help to constrain these costs and risks of abuse, and that on balance,
Shareholder Cultivation could enhance governance outcomes."
In conclusion, Shareholder Cultivation is poised to play an active
role in future governance design. It represents a bottom-up,
collaborative, "third-way" approach to governance design, which can
help overcome some of the market failures and regulatory failures that
have proven problematic for traditional corporate governance
approaches.52
41See infra Part IV.F.4.
4 2See infra Part IV.F.1-7.
43See infra Part V.
"See infra Part V.A. 1.
4 5See infra Part V.A.5.
46See infra Part V.A.3.
47See infra Part V.B.2.
48See infra Part V.B.1.
49See infra Part V.B.3 for further discussion on the need for institutional investor-
specific cultivation strategies.
5 See infra Part V.B.2.
sSee infra Part V.B.3.
52See infra Part Ili.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(the "OECD") defines corporate governance as "the system by which
business corporations are directed and controlled," and notes that a
"corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among different participants in the company, such as the
board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and spells out the
rules and procedures for making . . . decisions on corporate affairs."53
One of the goals of corporate governance is to design governance
structures and systems which encourage boards and managers to make
decisions that benefit the long-term interests of the firm and its
shareholders.54 However, recurrent episodes of firm actions that proved
detrimental to the long-term interests of both the firm and its
shareholders (and oftentimes, to the economy as a whole) highlight the
need for constant re-evaluation of the efficacy of corporate governance
rules and policies." Examples of such episodes include the 1980s saving
and loan crisis; the catastrophic demises of companies like Enron,
Worldcom, and Global Crossing in 2001-2002, largely blamed on abuses
of power and lack of accountability, transparency, and oversight of
corporate executives; and the 2008 financial crisis." As the OECD
530RG. FOR ECoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
NON-LISTED COMPANIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 15 n.2 (2006),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/582ffa804af4b8b8a5cfb5b94e6f4d75/oecdnonlist.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES.
54See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding the
board's considerations of community effects are rational business decisions that support
the long-term viability of the company); Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. § 6.6 (Dec. 1,
1992), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (stating that boards are accountable
to shareholders who comply with the code because the board acts as stewards on behalf
of the shareholders); ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING
PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS §§ 1-2 (2007),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/FinalPrinciples.pdf (presenti
ng that a company's and an investor's implementation of long-term incentives and measures
benefit one another); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 18 n.46 (Little, Brown &
Company, 1986) (explaining that maximizing profits means accounting for the "long-range
results" of a business); ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58-61 (2004) (hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES],
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/calcorporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf (discussing
the responsibilities of the board to include acting in good faith and with due diligence and high
ethical standards for the benefit of the company and the shareholders).
s5See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
56See Davita Silfen Glasberg & Dan Skidmore, The Dialectics of White-Collar
Crime: The Anatomy of the Savings and Loan Crisis of Silverado Banking, Savings and Loan
798 [Vol. 38
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acknowledged in its "Principles of Governance," "[t]he [2008] financial
crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most
needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that
companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices."" In
response to these "revealed shortcomings" the OECD developed an
"ambitious action plan" which identified four "priority areas" for
improvement-"remuneration, risk management, board practices, and the
exercise of shareholder rights.""
Additionally, several voices from both the public and private
sectors have drawn attention to other simmering problems, which
regulators have either not addressed or have been slow to address." Such
problems include: absentee share ownership, which manifests in the form
of empty voting;"o the perceived abuses of shareholder privileges by
some activist investors;' the unease with the practices and influence of
third-party proxy advisors;62 the increased presence of short-term
arbitrageurs;63 and the vulnerabilities created by high-speed trading
platforms.'
Association, 57 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 423, 445 (1998) (discussing that the savings and loan
crisis was the result of a lack of corporate oversight); see also Joseph A. Petrick & Robert F.
Scherer, The Enron Scandal and the Neglect of Management Integrity Capacity, 18 AM. J.
Bus. 37, 38 (2003) (stating at the core of the Enron crisis was the neglect of managerial
integrity); WorldCom: Accounting for Change, ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002,
http://www.economist.com/node/1200748 (stating that the misdeeds at Enron, Global Crossing
and WorldCom are examples of abuse).
5 7OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, at 58-61.
58 d
"See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
60See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1069-70 (2006)
(concluding that hedge-fund shareholders participate in new vote buying, which leads to empty
voting); see also Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, July 14, 2010
(discussing empty voting).
6See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1307 (2008) (concluding that activist investors engage in leveraging
schemes on behalf of shareholders).
62See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 438 (2009)
(arguing that third-party proxy advisors are less accountable and more problematic to
corporate management); see also Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495
(explaining that third-party proxy advisors do not always possess the requisite vote
information for shareholders).
63See BOGLE ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (presenting the problems associated with short-
term investors).
"See Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It $440 Million,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012; Jenny Strasburg & Jacob Bunge, Loss Swamps Trading Firm:
Knight Capital Searches for Partner as Tab for Computer Glitch Hits $440 Million, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 3, 2012 (reporting that high-speed computer trading systems caused a corporation
20 14] 799
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Furthermore, the notion of shareholders as owners has become
more nebulous and attenuated as shareholders become more
heterogeneous and transient."5 For example, a single company's
shareholder base could include individual shareholders who invest
because they like the company's goods or services; institutional investors
such as pension funds or mutual funds, whose primary duty is to their
respective investors; index funds whose managers may not necessarily
care about the individual company's performance, but are more
concerned about matching the index; short-term speculators who benefit
from market fluctuations and instability; and "tape readers," who trade in
bursts and have minimal interest in understanding the business of the
companies behind the shares." Thus the concern for companies is that
share ownership has become disembodied from the long-term health and
interests of the firm." Shareholder Cultivation attempts to reconnect
ownership to the firm, so that ownership becomes what Marjorie Kelly
terms more "rooted" in the values and interests of the firm, rather than
being connected solely in the intangible realm of the Committee on
Uniform Securities Identification Procedure ("CUSIP") and stock
registers."
Moreover, a larger point emerges from the above picture: the fast-
paced, interconnected, and dynamic nature of today's capital markets and
share ownership place corporate governance policymakers in the
uncomfortable position of having constantly to play regulatory catch-
up.6" The capital market landscape, like the broader society of which it is
millions of dollars because of a slight glitch).
65See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66See, e.g., James Sterngold & Jenny Strasburg, For SAC, a Shift in Investing Strategy
Later Led to Suspicions: After Steven Cohen's Hedge Fund Turned Focus to Market-Moving
Info, Regulators Grew Wary, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013 (discussing how short-term, stock-
trading companies have little vested interest in the companies in which they invest).
67See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
6 8MARIORIE KELLY, OWNING OUR FUTURE: THE EMERGING OWNERSHIP
REVOLUTION 104-05, 167-68 (2012) (stating that firms engaging in rooted membership create
an environment in which employees' work and stewardship become a tangible connection to
the success of the firm). The CUSIP is a nine character alphanumeric code assigned to all
North American financial securities that facilitates the clearance and settlement of security
trades. See LOAN SYNDICATION & TRADINGS AsS'N CUSIP GUIDELINES 3 (2011),
http://www.1sta.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=15110. While CUSIPs obviously
serve an important clearance and settlement function, the point is that stewardship share
ownership should involve a more tangible and meaningful connection to the underlying
company and its mission. See id.
6 9Cf Cary Coglianese et al., HARV. UNIV., The Role of Government
in Corporate Governance, 6 (2004),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers
/mrcbg/programs/rpp/reports/RPPREPORT8.pdf (finding that the government is often playing
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a part, is more interconnected, more digitized, more virtual, and more
dynamic with the result of a gulf widening between regulatory
prescriptions and present reality.70 As new technologies, new investment
vehicles, and new trading strategies emerge, one can only expect that the
gap between regulatory responses and perceived on-the-ground problems
will continue to widen in an unprecedented way."
One solution to filling the gap between problem and response lies
in engaging private parties and bottom-up, collaborative initiatives that
respond to a given problem. Shareholder Cultivation arguably serves
this gap-filling function and normatively meshes with the new
governance paradigm, which advocates for a complementary approach in
interconnected and dynamic environments, such as the corporate
governance space.
III. NEW GOVERNANCE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR CULTIVATION
New Governance is "a school of thought that focuses on the
significance of institutional design and culture for effective and
legitimate regulation."" New governance scholars simultaneously
challenge the conventional wisdom that effective regulation should
involve top-down and command-and-control rules, while rejecting a
complete shift from top-down government toward pure market or self-
regulation." In doing so, new governance provides a "third-way
approach" that bridges the divide between self-governance and
unregulated markets on one hand, and top-down government controls on
catch-up to organizations).
"oSee id.
"See id
72Lobel, supra note 24, at 65.
7 3 1d See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (discussing the government's need to
adopt a new approach to deregulation to increase market efficiency); Cristie Ford, New
Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIs. L.
REv. 441, 445 (arguing for the adoption of a pragmatist approach involving empirical
experiences, flexibility, and humility); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 466-67
(2004) (arguing for the adoption of the Renew Deal approach requiring economic efficiency,
political legitimacy, and social democracy); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015,
1100-01 (2004) (arguing that the adoption of the experimentalist approach avoids the defects
of rule-bound intervention and is responsive to judicial concerns); Joanne Scott & Susan
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 565, 567 (2007) (arguing for the adopting of a catalyst approach, as used by European
courts, to promote legitimate-and-effective governance decisions).
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the other.74 In analyzing a given context, new governance scholars often
begin with a critical examination of both market failures and governance
failures that exist in a given space, with the hope of developing a
systematic map of the "range of possibilities in the interaction between
regulation and regulated actors . . . ."" While "new governance strategies
spring from a discontent with the results produced by traditional
[top-down] techniques . . . . [i]n their willingness to synthesize an
emerging social vision, [new governance] scholars and policy-makers
move beyond entrenched and failed government structures while
resisting simplistic attacks on the role of government intervention.""
In a new governance frame, regulated entities are not simply
regulatory objects, but instead are recognized and become engaged as
"norm-generating subjects."" In doing so, new governance aims to
create a participatory, cooperative, and collaborative form of governance
that responds to the failures of both markets and regulators, and which is
both effective and legitimate." New governance can be conceptualized
as a governance paradigm that "attempts to renew and intervene in
otherwise stalemated debates.""
One schema for conceptualizing the new governance approach was
developed by noted new governance scholar, Orly Lobel. 0 Professor
Lobel "describe[s] the new governance model of regulation as consisting
of eight clusters of approaches[:] . . . (1) increased participation of non-
state actors; (2) public-private collaboration; (3) diversity and
competition within the market; (4) decentralization; (5) integration of
policy domains; (6) non-coerciveness ('soft law'); (7) adaptability and
constant learning; [and] (8) coordination."" First, the new governance
frame explicitly requires the participation of private actors in the
creation, implementation, and enforcement of regulatory norms and rules
because it "challenges the conventional assumptions" that traditional
regulatory bodies have "superior knowledge, information, and expertise"
than the private actors which they seek to regulate.82 The second
approach of public-private collaboration is a natural corollary to the first
74Lobel, supra note 24, at 68-69.
7Id. at 65.761d. at 70.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
78 See Lobel, supra note 24, at 67.
9 d. at 69.
8oSee infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
"Lobel, supra note 24, at 66.821d
802 [Vol. 38
SHAREHOLDER CULTIVATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE
and furthers the recognition that cooperation and collaboration between
regulatory bodies and regulated entities should lead to enhanced
governance outcomes." Similarly, the "diversity and competition"
approach refers to the idea "that a sustainable legal regime must
encompass a multitude of values, account for conflict and compromise,
acknowledge the diversity and changing interests of many participants,
and recognize the legitimacy of private economic interests while
appealing to public values."" Relatedly, the concept of decentralization
reflects the notion that the locus of regulation is not solely the state, but
that the private sector has regulatory agency in the creation and
promotion of governance norms and values." The fifth approach in new
governance-"integration of policy domains"-attempts to connect
seemingly dispersed issues across seemingly distinct domains with the
view that often these issues are "nonetheless connected at the level of
those who are most influenced by them . . ."'6 Thus, for example, in a
traditional regulatory model, laws are fragmented into different domains,
such as securities regulation, environmental regulation, and food and
safety." In a new governance frame, the involvement of private actors,
the collaboration between public and private, the decentralization of
agency, and the principle of diversity and competition, "all potentially
lead to revealing the ways in which dispersed issues . . . are nonetheless
connected at the level of those who are most influenced by them."88
Continuing the theme of collaboration, the principle of non-coerciveness
refers to new governance's aim to create a more flexible, open, and
collaborative environment that is "more conducive to participation and
83See id. at 67. The recognition of the importance of input from private actors
and the benefits of public-private collaboration are not unique to the new governance frame.
See, e.g., Rulemaking, How It Works, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rulemaking.htm (last modified Apr. 6, 2011). For example,
administrative agencies like the SEC often invite collaboration and private-actor input in their
rulemaking process through their "notice and comment" framework, which allows any
interested party to formally contribute their thought to the proposed rule. See id Where the
new governance frame differs, however, is that new governance views the "different sectors"
of society-"state, market, and civil society-as part of one comprehensive, interlocking
system.... [in which] individuals are ... involved in the process of developing and changing
the norms of behavior, in contrast to [a top-down model], under which private actors are the
objects of regulation." Lobel, supra note 24, at 67.
8Lobel, supra note 24, at 67.
85See id.
86Id.
87See id.
88Lobel, supra note 24, at 67.
2014] 803
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
dialogue."" The adaptability and constant learning strand echoes this
notion of flexibility and recognizes that questions of "what works and
what fails . . . must be constantly examined and re-examined."" Finally,
the eighth approach of coordination primarily refers to a key role of the
state and regulatory agencies in the new governance frame, which is to
facilitate "the communication of local knowledge and the structured
interactions of separate groups[,]" both to "foster a culture of compliance
within regulated industries," and to "promote and standardize innovations
that began locally and privately."'
A. New Governance in Corporate Governance
In applying new governance learning to the corporate governance
space we confront the question of identifying market and governance
failures that occupy the space." Examples of market failures include the
aforementioned savings and loans crisis in the 1980s;" the accounting
scandals that led to the demise of several large corporations in the early
2000s;' the subprime mortgage crisis, which has been blamed on
unscrupulous lending practices by banks;" and the 2008 financial crisis."
In each of these instances of market failure, government intervened with
new laws and regulations intended to prevent a recurrence of market
breakdown."
In identifying regulatory failures in the corporate governance
space, the description espoused by Professor Saule Omarova is
891d.
901d.
9 Id. at 67, 71.
92See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
93See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP To BANKING, ch. 4 (1997) [hereinafter S&L CRISIS], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf ("The vast number of actual and
threatened insolvencies of savings and loan associations in the 1980s was predictable because
of the interest-rate mismatch of the institutions' balance sheets.").
94See Petrick & Scherer, supra note 56, at 38.
95See Charles W. Calomiris, The Mortgage Crisis: Some Inside View,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903927204576574433454435452.
96See Glasberg & Skidmore, supra note 56, at 445.
97See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); Troubled Asset
Relief Program, 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (Supp. 2008); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (Supp. IV 2011); S&L CRISIS, supra note 93, ch.
4.
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particularly helpful." Professor Omarova categorizes regulatory failures
as the "inability [of government] to design appropriately sophisticated
and effective legal and policy instruments to address complex social
problems (instrument failure), inadequate implementation of the rules
(implementation failure), and failure to motivate the regulated entities
and individuals to comply with the rules (motivational failure)."" With
respect to instrument failure in the corporate space, one might point to
the 2003 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rule-
which in an effort to encourage mutual funds to exercise their fiduciary
duties in a more responsible way, mandated that mutual funds publicly
disclose how they vote.'0 The SEC did not, however, anticipate that the
effect of this rule would be to incentivize mutual funds to further
outsource voting logistics to third-party proxy advisor intermediaries,
who in turn have brought a whole new slew of governance problems.'
Similarly, the reaction by regulated entities to the 1993 federal tax
law amendments is illustrative of implementation failure."2  The
amended tax provisions were intended to curb perceived excesses in
executive compensation and provided that companies could not deduct,
as a business expense, compensation paid to an executive in excess of
one million dollars unless such compensation was linked to an objective
measure of corporate performance.' 3 Instead of curbing the amount of
compensation, the 1993 tax amendments simply had the effect of
limiting the salary portion to one million dollars, while the incentive pay
portion skyrocketed.'" Of the three regulatory failures articulated by
Omarova, motivational failure is most difficult to measure.' However,
indicators of motivational failure, such as a failure to comply with insider
""See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
""Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial
Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 672 (2010).
looDisclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,739,
Sept. 20, 2002.
'"See Belinfanti, supra note 62, at 393-94. While mutual funds and other registered
management investment companies are required to disclose their proxy voting records on an
annual basis on Form N-PX, the concern here is not with disclosure but with the potential
influence that proxy advisors may have on the mutual funds' voting decision. Annual Report
of Proxy Voting Record of Registered Management Investment Company (Form N-PX),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-px.pdf.
102See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder
Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 127 (2000).
103See id. at 128-29.
104 See id. at 131.
05oSee Omarova, supra note 99, at 672.
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trading rules, may also be symptomatic of both implementation and
instrument failures.106
More broadly speaking, corporate governance may have a
"stalemate" problem both in terms of approach and in terms of the
inability of its regulated constituents, i.e., corporate executives and
shareholders, to agree on what is needed to enhance governance
outcomes."' In general, shareholders view the solution as more
"shareholder rights" and "shareholder democracy," while executives
view the solution as controlling abusive shareholder practices and
honoring corporate law's default choice that assigns the power to manage
the "business and affairs" to the board and officers.' Thus, while
corporate governance aims to design rules that encourage alignment
between the interests of shareholders and those of managers, the current
relationship between managers and shareholders in general can hardly be
described as aligned or effective.'o There is mutual mistrust between
both groups and this mistrust may be further aggravated by corporate
governance rules and policies that do not necessarily address the realities
of the relationship (what new governance's "diversity and competition"
approach would view as a failure to "acknowledge the diversity and
changing interests of [a multitude of] participants . . . .")."' Moreover,
the accusations that shareholders and managers levy at each other have
not changed significantly-shareholders accuse managers of being
greedy, unmotivated, and self-interested, while managers accuse
shareholders of both being self-interested and not understanding the
company's business (the aforementioned "stalemate" problem).'"
Top-down corporate governance policies, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank, while in many ways necessary to address certain market
failures, have formalized and sanitized the shareholder-manager
06See id
07See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IOWA L. REv. 1, 5-6 & n.16 (2002).
08See id. at 25; Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J.
1259, 1260'(2009); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2011) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.").
'
09See Fox & Lorsch, supra note 1, at 50.
"oLobel, supra note 24, at 67.
"'See Fox & Lorsch, supra note 1, at 50, 56; see also supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
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relationship, but have arguably done very little to improve the underlying
quality of the relationship.1 12
B. Shareholder Cultivation as New Governance
While the new governance paradigm often focuses on the interplay
between the regulators and the regulated, Shareholder Cultivation
primarily involves the interplay between a firm and its shareholders.
Nonetheless, viewing Shareholder Cultivation through a new governance
frame has analytical currency. In new governance parlance, Shareholder
Cultivation is an example of an "innovation[ ]that began locally and
privately""3 in response to this stalemate problem and in response to the
changing dynamics of share ownership."4 Similarly, Shareholder
Cultivation can be conceptualized as part of the "norm generating
process," which in turn can then inform and influence how firms and
policymakers think about corporate governance design. It potentially
offers a "third-way approach" in corporate governance design, whereby
managers leverage the heterogeneous dynamics of a firm's shareholder
base to identify and cultivate a core of committed shareholders."'
More specifically, Shareholder Cultivation activates all "eight
clusters" of the new governance approach described above"' -- first, it
engages private actors and, through their collaboration, an innovative
means of actualizing corporate governance can emerge;"' second, it
invites public or private collaboration;" third, it is arguably born out of
the realization of the "diversity and competition" in capital markets, and
as such, it recognizes the "diversity and changing interests of many
stakeholders" and seeks to legitimize the private interests of the parties
112See Fox & Lorsch, supra note 1, at 56-57; see also Lobel, supra note 24, at 76.
"
3Lobel, supra note 24, at 67.
"
4See id. at 69 (explaining that new governance tries to "renew and intervene" in
disputes that are at a standstill as well as respond to the changes in the type of goods,
commerce, work, and additional threats).
..See id. ("[P]olicymakers and scholars are focusing their attention on new
governance as a set of legal strategies outside the traditional command-and-control toolbox
that has the potential to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of social regulation.").
"
6 See infra Part Ill.
"'See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 73, at 371, 373-74 ("Increased participation [of private
actors] permeates the many levels and stages of legal process ... . [I]t enhances the ability of
citizens to participate in political and civic life."); see also Lobel, supra note 24, at 66-67.
"
8 See Lobel, supra note 73, at 376-77 ("It signifies a move to partnership, to
horizontal relationships, and to two-way communications. The goal is to create microsystems
of open communication in which policy is imagined, managed, and maintained.").
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"while appealing to public values," such as long-term value creation and
sustainability;"' fourth, it decentralizes corporate governance practices
and activities from state agencies back to the affected private parties;'20
fifth, in terms of "integration of policy domains," collaboration and
knowledge-sharing between shareholder stewards and firm management
could lead to enhanced thinking on how seemingly dispersed issues are
connected and can be solved; 2' sixth, Shareholder Cultivation embodies
new governance's "non-coerciveness approach" in that successful
Shareholder Cultivation "create[s] an environment more conducive to
participation and dialogue[]";'22 finally, the seventh and eighth
approaches of "adaptability and constant learning" and "legal
coordination" highlight the need to constantly assess Shareholder
Cultivation practices and costs, as well as the role of regulatory bodies in
capitalizing on-and scaling-successful cultivation practices and
innovations.'23 As discussed in Part IV.D.3., there are various levers,
such as communication rules or reporting best practices, that regulatory
agencies can utilize to "promote and standardize" these cultivation
practices and innovations.'24
C. The Cultivation Framework
As previously noted, a necessary role of government under a new
governance approach is to "foster a culture of compliance within
regulated industries,"'25 and to "promote and standardize innovations that
"
9See id. at 379-80.
2oSee id at 381-85 (discussing four functions of decentralization including the
following: encouraging governance interests, confirming the concept of subsidiarity,
producing "relational density and synergy," and maintaining a setting conducive to democratic
involvement).
121See id. at 385. The new governance theory considers the interrelationships of the
multiple legal areas when faced with resolving an issue. See id. at 385-86.
122See Lobel, supra note 73, at 388 ("The [non-coerciveness approach] aims to create a
flexible and fluid policy environment that fosters 'softer' processes that either replace or
complement the traditional 'hard' ordering of the regulatory model.").
123For discussion on the seventh approach, see id. at 395-96, which stresses the need to
continue learning in governance. For discussion on the eighth approach, see id. at 400-01,
which notes that "[s]caling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and
researching and replicating success stories from local or private levels are central goals of
government."
'
24See infra Part IV.D.3.
'
25Lobel, supra note 24, at 71 (explaining the various ways in which government
agencies encourage compliance with the rules).
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began locally and privately."'26 This Sub-Part contemplates how this
could be achieved in the corporate governance space.'27 Chief among the
concerns is how to determine which cultivation efforts on the part of
private firms will be allowed and which ones are off limits. To facilitate
this exercise of delineating the boundaries of cultivation and permissible
cultivation practices (which can be visualized as a "cultivation zone" or
"cultivation playing field"), the Ayres-Gertner construct of immutable
rules and default rules is particularly helpful.'28
In a 1989 law review titled Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, Professors Ayres and Gertner
argue that "[t]he legal rules of contracts and corporations [could] be
divided into two distinct classes"-immutable rules and default rules.'29
"Immutable" rules consist of those rules that the parties could not
"change by contractual agreement."3 o "Default" rules, on the other hand,
consist of those classes of rules that "parties can contract around by prior
agreement . . . ."' Ayres and Gertner conceptualize default rules as
"fill[ing] the gaps in incomplete contracts," i.e., these default rules will
"govern unless the parties contract around them."32  As Ayers and
Gertner note, corporate law rules can also be divided between these two
classes of immutable rules and default rules."' For immutable rules, the
authors cite, as an example, the rule regarding the rights of shareholders
to "elect directors annually"; however, a default rule prescribes that most
corporate statutes "allow the articles of incorporation to contract around
the default rule of straight voting."'34 Other immutable corporate rules
include the rule that shareholders have a right to vote on an amendment
to the corporation's articles of incorporation and the rule that
shareholders have a right to vote on a transaction that will result in the
126I. at 67; see also supra Part III.
See infra Part IfI.C.
128See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25, at 87-88 (describing the differences between
immutable rules and default rules and including examples of each rule).
129I. at 87.
130,d.
132Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25, at 87.
133See id at 91 (explaining that default rules can be divided into three categories: (1)
penalty defaults, created to encourage at least one party to contract around the default rules; (2)
tailored defaults, created to afford the parties with exactly what they would have asked for in
the contract; and (3) untailored defaults, created to offer the parties to a contract a generic
standard that is intended to represent what most parties to a contract would desire).
134Id. at 87-88.
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sale or change of control of the firm.' Examples of other default
corporate rules include rules regarding the setting of a record date, rules
regarding the reimbursement of proxy expenses, and rules regarding
special shareholder meetings.'
While Ayres' and Gertner's analysis centers on how lawmakers
should choose among various default rules, it is beyond the scope of this
article to question corporate law's choice of existing default rules.'37 The
argument here is simply that an immutable-default rule construct is a
useful analytical tool for thinking about the outer boundaries of
Shareholder Cultivation and relatedly, the creation of permissible
cultivation zones.' Thus, immutable corporate law rules would
demarcate the outer boundaries of cultivation activities, while default
corporate law rules would be within the zone of play.'
Finally, in a new governance frame, the immutable-default rule
construct provides both regulators and regulated private parties with an
operable framework for assessing the appropriateness of a given
cultivation activity. A key role of regulators would consist of promoting
and coordinating appropriate cultivation activities-through such actions
as policy statements, SEC "no-action" letters, or best practice
135See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2011) ("At the meeting a vote of the
stockholders entitled to vote thereon shall be taken for and against the proposed amendment.");
Id. § 271(a) ("[C]orporation[s] may at any meeting . . . sell, lease or exchange all or
substantially all of its property and assets ... when and as authorized by a resolution adopted
by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote
thereon . . . .").
136Section 213(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides:
If no record date is fixed by the board of directors, the record date for determining
stockholders entitled to notice of and to vote at a meeting of stockholders shall be at
the close of business on the day next preceding the day on which notice is given, or,
if notice is waived, at the close of business on the day next preceding the day on
which the meeting is held.
Id. § 213(a); see also id. § 113(a) ("The bylaws may provide for the reimbursement by the
corporation of expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection with an
election of directors, subject to such procedures or conditions as the bylaws may
prescribe . . . ."); Id. § 211(d) ("Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the
board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of
incorporation or by the bylaws.").
137See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25, at 89, 91 (discussing the need to confirm the
theory utilized when faced with selecting default rules).
138See infra Part III.C.
139For both immutable and default rules, such rules include not only "hard" rules
formalized by statute or regulation, but would also include soft law, general norms, and
policies, which, although not formalized, are generally recognized to be inviolate. See Lobel,
supra note 73, at 388.
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prescriptions-to create a safe zone for companies to engage in
Shareholder Cultivation.
IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: SHAREHOLDER CULTIVATION TOOLS
AND STRATEGIES
To be clear, the suggestion is not that a public corporation could
cultivate its entire shareholder base. Rather, Shareholder Cultivation is
about leveraging existing market conditions and legal rules to cultivate a
stabilizing core of committed shareholders.140 Several CEOs recognize
this and openly express their views on the types of shareholders that are
welcomed in their base and those who are not.14' Warren Buffett,
chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, is a prime example of a manager who
explicitly embraces a Shareholder Cultivation ethos.'42 In June 1996,
Buffett issued a manifesto to Berkshire's stockholders titled "An Owner's
Manual" which laid out the company's business principles and
managerial approach as well as the expectations Berkshire had of its
shareholders.'43 The first principle outlined addressed Berkshire's view
of the relationship it aspired to have and maintain with its shareholders.'"
Buffett wrote:
[We] think of our shareholders as owner-partners . . . . [We]
hope that you [the shareholder] do not think of yourself as
merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around
daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic
or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead
visualize yourself as part owner of a business . . . . For our
part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless
members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-
venturers . . . . Obviously, [we] can't control Berkshire's
price. But by our policies and communications, we can
140See infra Part IV.D.
"'See, e.g., BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 1 (1996),
hUp://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ownman.pdf (explaining the expectations Buffett has for
his shareholders).
142See id.
143See id.
'"See id.
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encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in
turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational.'45
Similarly, in his 1983 annual letter to shareholders, Buffett wrote,
"Through our policies and communications . .. we try to attract investors
who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And,
fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won't)." 46
Buffett's expressed sentiment of striving to "attract investors who
will understand [Berkshire's] operations, attitudes and expectations" and
of seeking out "co-venturers" is precisely what Shareholder Cultivation is
about.'47 What counts as a "co-venturer" will differ from firm to firm, but
it captures the concept of a shareholder steward. There is not, and there
cannot be, one homogenous set of specific characteristics. Two
characteristics of a shareholder steward, however, that should be
invariable and constant across firms include: (1) the shareholder's
investment behavior meshes with the firm's vision and operational
strategy; and (2) the shareholder understands and is supportive of the
firm's mission and management's long-term strategy. As discussed
below, there are various techniques and heuristics that firms use to
identify potential co-venturers.'4 8
Conversely, for purposes of Shareholder Cultivation, it is equally
important for a firm to determine and identify those shareholders whose
investment behavior and belief system tend to indicate non-co-venturer
characteristics. Indicators of non-co-venturer characteristics will also
differ from firm to firm, but generally speaking, firms seem to have a
preference for limiting shareholder arbitrageurs,'49 shareholders who
engage in empty voting,'o and activist shareholders who seek to impose
their personal business judgment on management."' While some amount
145BUFFETF, supra note 6, at 1, 4.
'4Letter from Warren E. Buffett to Berkshire Hathaway Inc., supra note 11.
147Id.; BUFFErr, supra note 6, at I ("[We] view Berkshire shareholders as . . . co-
venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder
of their lives.").
148See infra Part IV.C.
149See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REv. 561, 580 & n.88 (2006) (noting that arbitrageurs take short-term gains at the
expense of long-term performance to attract and retain investors).
's
0 ee Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 61, at 1280 ("[A] hedge fund can buy ... stock
and vote the shares while simultaneously entering a derivatives contract that hedges away its
economic interest in stock. . . . and then seek to profit from using its power as a formal
shareholder to push for business policies that drive the stock price down.").
'
5
'See id at 1270 (concluding a minority shareholder imposes its personal business
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of short-term trading is beneficial to the firm in terms of, inter alia,
increased liquidity and visibility for the firm's stock, as discussed below,
firms tend to prefer a lower turnover rate to a higher one.15 2
A. The Cultivation Spectrum
Shareholder Cultivation tools can be conceptualized as falling
along a spectrum-starting with pre-cultivation activities such as the art
of effectively using narrative to engage a firm's mission;' through the
identification and selection of potential shareholder stewards;'
employing strategies to recruit potential stewards and in many cases,
re-enforce or activate stewardship norms among existing shareholders;'
and to de-cultivation efforts that attempt to shake or limit the
attractiveness of the firm's shareholder base to gamblers and non-co-
venturers."6 Thus, in general one could visualize a cultivation spectrum
as follows:
Cultivation Spectrum:
Pre- Enlistmnt & De-
Cuiivtira Idenisffication R fe-Cultorcetionir Cultivationi
The assignment of tools to specific segments of the cultivation
spectrum should be thought of as liminal rather than fixed. As discussed
below, certain tools such as the adoption of a time-weighted dividend
policy, for example, serve different purposes for different shareholders or
would-be investors.'" Thus, they occupy multiple points along the
spectrum at any given period in time, or vacillate across different points
of the spectrum at different points in time.'
judgment on management when it substitutes its own judgment for the board of directors).
152See, e.g., Fox & Lorsch, supra note 1, at 52 (finding the more influence short-term
traders have on the market prices the more volatile those prices will be since short-term traders
are less interested in the fundamental value of the corporation they are trading).
'See infra Part IV.B.
'
54See infra Part IV.C.
'sSee infra Part IV.D.
"See infra Part IV.E.
'See infra Part IV.F.2.
'See infra Part IV.F.2.
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B. Pre-Cultivation Tools: Defining Narrative and Embodying Mission
The first step in the cultivation process is for the firm to define its
mission and to systematically strive to ensure that its practices and
policies embody and reflect that mission.'" The firm's mission or
purpose is its "raison d'etre.'"0 A corporate purpose or mission should
serve as a blueprint for the firm's decisions and actions."' State corporate
laws give firms wide latitude in defining their purpose and mission.'62
For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL")
provides that "[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under
this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or
purposes . . . .6"" Similarly, the Pennsylvania Business Corporations Act
provides that "every business corporation has as its corporate purpose the
engaging in lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated
under the BCL."'" Thus, state corporate laws leave a wide zone of play
for firms to define their mission and purpose.' 5
The attendant benefits of defining a corporation's purpose and
mission have been robustly dealt with in the managerial literature.' 6
Those benefits can be summarized as "provid[ing] direction to
strategy . . . bring[ing] meaning to the work of others .. . infus[ing] the
'"See PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 75
(1974) [hereinafter DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT] ("Only a clear definition of the mission and
purpose of the business makes possible clear and realistic business objectives.").
'soRICHARD R. ELLSWORTH, LEADING WITH PURPOSE: THE NEW CORPORATE
REALITIES 4 (2002). "Raison d'etre" means "overriding reason for existing." Id.
See, e.g., DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT, supra note 159, at 75.
162See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
163DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011).
'619 PA. CODE § 23.4(b) (2013).
'
6 5Although the terms "mission" and "purpose" are often used interchangeably, in
practice a firm's "purpose" can be found in its articles of incorporation and is often more terse
and concise than its "mission", which is often put forth in its mission statement and which
tends to be more expansive than the "purpose" stated in the firm's articles of incorporation.
See ELLSWORTH, supra note 160, at 97 ("Purpose defines the cause. The mission gives it
depth and richness.").
'"See generally CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 42
(Harvard Univ. Press, 30th Anniversary ed. 1966) ("A formal system of cooperation requires
an objective, a purpose, an aim."); PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 176
(Harper & Row, 2d rev. ed. 1983) ("If the corporation does not have a clear policy and a
definite organ of policy decision, its actions and behavior become unpredictable."); DRUCKER,
MANAGEMENT, supra note 159, at 74 ("A clear, simple, and penetrating theory of the business
rather than intuition characterizes the truly successful . . . organization that can endure and
grow .... ); ELLSWORTH, supra note 160, at 2 ("[L]eadership's failure to define a clear
purpose . . . explains much of the tension, conflict, and ambivalence that inflict American
companies today.").
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organization with value, and consequently . .. stimulat[ing] commitment
and action."67
One chief executive officer expressed the sentiment as such:
I believe a clear purpose is an essential building block in the
foundation of a more responsible capitalism. You can't
achieve your purpose in a quarter, or a year. It serves as a
statement of why a company exists, and more fundamentally
why a company merits having a corporate charter and
receive the protections of society.6
For Shareholder Cultivation, "a clear purpose is an essential building
block" for attracting and recruiting shareholder stewards -but for it to
serve this role, the firm's purpose must actually become embodied in its
practices and policies.'6 1
A firm's mission should then inform the narrative that the firm
develops to explain its value proposition and operational strategies to
shareholders, other stakeholders, and society at large.' For many
corporations their narrative is often memorialized in their mission
statements."' However, to be an effective cultivation tool, it should also
carry through to communications with shareholders and other
stakeholders, the company's annual reports, sell-side-analyst calls,
executive compensation practices, and any other points of interface that
the company has with stakeholders and external constituents which
provide an opportunity for the company to reiterate its story and its value
proposition.'72
PepsiCo, Inc.'s interwoven approach to mission and narrative
provides a case in point. PepsiCo divides its narrative into three
component parts: (1) "Our Mission"; (2) "Our Vision"; and (3)
167ELLSWORTH, supra note 160, at x.
'
68David H. Langstaff, President and CEO of TASC, Inc., Address at the Kellogg
School of Management/Aspen Institute Business and Society Conference: Rethinking
'Shareholder Value,' the Purpose of the Corporation (March 7-8, 2013),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/Tomorrow%27s%2Corporati
on-March%207%202013.pdfwidth=100.
'
69See id.
'
7oTelephone Interview with Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief Commc'ns
Officer, Wright Med. Grp. (Jan. 14, 2013).
'See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
172See ELLSWORTH, supra note 160, at 327-28 (finding the leader is responsible for
presenting the firm's characteristics, including its mission, to the marketplace, customers,
employees, shareholders, and communities).
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"Performance With Purpose."' The details of its narrative are found in
its mission statement, which, under the "Performance With Purpose" sub-
heading, states that:
At PepsiCo, we're committed to achieving business and
financial success while leaving a positive imprint on society
- delivering what we call Performance with Purpose.
Our approach to superior financial performance is
straightforward - drive shareholder value. By addressing
social and environmental issues, we also deliver on our
purpose agenda, which consists of human, environmental,
and talent sustainability.7"
The company's mission is thus embedded in its narrative, and in turn, its
narrative threads through to its annual report, which repeatedly uses
terms such as "organic revenue," "growth," "sustainability," and "long-
term," which all capture and convey the spirit of Pepsi's mission
statement and signal to the market that Pepsi is about "shareholder value"
and value to society.'" Similarly, Pepsi's narrative of financial success,
along with societal benefit, is reflected in its approach to executive
compensation where at least some portion of compensation is tied to
non-financial metrics.'76
As pre-cultivation tools, mission-embodying and successfully
weaving a narrative are important for attracting and retaining shareholder
stewards in several ways and can be effective along different points of
the cultivation spectrum."' First, mission and narrative can serve as
recruiting tools to explain the firm's value proposition and vision to
potential shareholders."' In this regard, they serve both a framing and
benchmarking function in that they provide target shareholders with a
reference point and framework for thinking about and assessing the
'
73 Our Mission & Values, PEPSICO.COM, http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Our-
Mission-and-Values (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
174 d
75See PepsiCo, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2, 7 (Feb. 21, 2013).
'
76See Pepsico 2011/2012 GRI Report, PEPSICO.COM, 23-24 (2011-2012),
http://www.pepsico.com/Download/PEPRPTI2_GRI%20Report v5.pdf.
177See Langstaff, supra note 168, at 9.
178See DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT, supra note 159, at 75 (emphasizing only a clear
definition of the mission will make possible realistic business objectives).
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firm's financial and non-financial value.'" Similarly, for the firm's agents
(for example, managers, directors, or its investor-relations department), a
tightly written mission and narrative provide a rhetorical frame that can
be used to shape discussion with both current shareholders and potential
investors, and advance the firm's goals and value proposition in a
consistent and effective way.' As is well-documented in the behavioral
literature, the way we frame and name things affect how they are
perceived by others. 8' A classic example is that when an identical
scenario is framed as a loss rather than as a gain, people are more
incentivized to avoid the scenario because the fear of loss has a more
powerful grip over a person's psyche than the possibility of gain.182
Secondly, mission and narrative can also serve as identification
tools because when successfully executed, they can incentivize
self-identification and self-selection by potential shareholder stewards
with whom the firm's mission and narrative resonate. Moreover, because
self-identifying by shareholders involves significantly less cost outlay on
the part of the company compared to the cost of the company engaging
in separate identification strategies (as discussed below), mission and
narrative that result in shareholder self-identification have the benefit of
lowering transaction costs to the firm. 183
Finally, in terms of the immutable and default rule construct
developed in Part I, pre-cultivation tools of mission and narrative operate
within a wide zone of latitude with the outward bounds being defined by
immutable rules such as the requirement that the firm be operated for a
"lawful" purpose.18
'"See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNow YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE 3-4 (2004); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981); see also George
Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Uses in Politics, ROCKRIDGE
INST., (Apr. 3, 2007) http://archives.evergreen.edu/webpages/curricular/2006-
2007/languageofpolitics/files/languageofpolitics/Simple%2OFraming%2ORockridge%20
Institute.pdf ("Communication itself comes with a frame. The elements of the Communication
frame include: A message, an audience, a messenger, a medium, images, a context, and
especially, higher-level moral and conceptual frames. The choice of language is, of course,
vital, but it is vital because language evokes frames-moral and conceptual frames.").
1soSee Lakoff, supra note 179.
'
811d. For an example of framing techniques in corporate law, see Tamara C.
Belinfanti, Beyond Economics in Pay for Performance, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 91, 149-50
(2012), which explores the potential use of framing to encourage certain outcomes in executive
compensation policies.
182See Belinfanti, supra note 181, at 150.
See infra Part VI.B.1.
'"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011).
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C. Identification and Sorting: Separating Stewards from Gamblers
Once a corporation has defined its mission and narrative (as
discussed above), it is in a position to narrow the universe of investors
that it seeks to target and cultivate.' Thus, the logical next step in the
Shareholder Cultivation process is sorting the investor base and
identifying a target group of potential shareholder stewards to cultivate.
To borrow Buffett's terminology, a firm should be looking for
shareholders who exhibit "co-venturer" characteristics that mesh with the
firm's vision, mission, and strategy.'"
Traditional identification techniques run the gamut, from combing
through stock ledger lists to identifying retail versus institutional
investors, to segregating investors by fund type (e.g., growth fund, value
fund, index fund), to the application of more complex analytical tools
that seek to gauge and predict shareholders' investment behavior and
average length of ownership in the firm's stock.' Firm size, firm
industry, and the firm's view of its value proposition are three of the key
factors that will determine how a firm defines its co-venturers and the
tools that the firm can employ to attract and recruit these co-venturers.'"
According to Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief
Communications Officer at Wright Medical Group, the size of the firm
(whether large cap, mid cap, small cap, or microcap), will "determine the
levers you can pull . .. and the levers that one can pull to try and attract
[the right shareholders] are not equally available to everyone."'"
Similarly, in terms of firm industry, different industries are
thought to attract different types of investors.'" For example,
slow-growth industries like utilities and manufacturing are generally
thought to attract so-called "income" investors who focus primarily on
the stream of dividends a given stock is likely to generate."' In contrast,
18See supra Part IV.B.
186BUFFETr, supra note 6, at 1.
'
87See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17
J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224, 246 (1986).
188Telephone Interview with Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief Commc'ns
Officer, Wright Med. Grp. (Jan. 14, 2013).
'
891d
'9'See generally Aswath Damodaran, Investing Basics Analyzing
Stocks, N.Y. UNIV. STERN SCH. OF Bus.,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edul-adamodar/NewHomePage/articles/valbasics.htm (categorizing
investors as either "value," "growth," "income," "GARP," or "quality," and discussing the kind
of company qualities each type of investor will seek).
19Id.
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high-growth industries, such as emerging technologies or green-building
construction, tend to attract "growth" investors, who focus primarily on
the underlying quality of the business and the rate of expected growth, as
opposed to immediate value and so-called "GARP" ("growth at a
reasonable price") investors, who combine the approaches of value
investors and growth investors to identify companies with "solid growth
prospects and current share prices that do not reflect the intrinsic value of
the business . . . ."192 Finally, in terms of the firm's value proposition, the
story a firm tells about its business and its future will determine the types
of investors the firm attracts. A story of future growth and no immediate
payoff, for example, would detract income investors but attract growth
and some GARP investors.
Another identification technique that corporations employ to
identify potential co-venturers is to compare their shareholder base with
that of peer firms with the hope of (1) identifying potential shareholders
to target; and (2) being able to compare the company's shareholder base
turnover profile to that of its competitors.'" For example, after going
through a series of financial restatements, in 2007 Canadian-based Nortel
Networks embarked on a peer review and benchmarking process, which
compared Nortel's shareholder base and level of shareholder engagement
with that of other S&P 500 and S&P/TSX 60 companies.194 Nortel
compared its shareholder base and its processes for communicating with
shareholders to those of peer firms, with a particular focus on
"benchmarking Nortel's schedule of one-on-ones, investor conferences
and analyst days" against those of its peers.' Similarly, consider the
case of Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"), an innovative technology
company who wanted to attract more long-term investors and decided to
"monitor[ ] and measur[e] the 'quality' of AMD's institutional investor
base."'" According to AMD, the company "had a crummy shareholder
base.... [t]here were a lot of fast-money hedge funds and momentum
investors actively trading the stock and [they] were not attracting long-
term investors."' AMD came to this conclusion after "monitoring and
192 Id
19 3Telephone Interview with Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief Commc'ns
Officer, Wright Med. Grp. (Jan. 14, 2013).
194See Neil Stewart, Extreme Measures: How to Measure Success in IR, IR MAG.
(Oct. 1 2008), http://www.irmagazine.com/articles/sell-side/15336/extreme-measures-how-
measure-success-ir/.
196Id.
197Id.
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measuring the quality of [its] institutional investor base," which included
calculating "[t]he weighted average turnover of AMD's top 50 mutual
fund holders[,]" which turned out to be 107 percent.' This translated to
a holding period of approximately eleven months.'" When AMD
compared this number to peer firms, it realized that peer companies had a
more patient shareholder base with an average holding period of
"between 15 and 30 months."" AMD then targeted shareholders whose
turnover profile matched its story of long-term growth and value and was
able to increase its weighted average holding period from eleven months
to twenty-seven months in the space of five years-a feat that AMD
viewed as a success.201
More contemporary identification tools attempt to drill down
further beyond the conventional shareholder categorizations of retail
versus institutional, and long-term versus short-term, and catalog
shareholders using different dimensions such as "intrinsic" or
"dedicated" shareholders versus "transient" shareholders. 202  A recent
study by Professor Brian Bushee on institutional investor behavior and
the relationship between observed behaviors and the types of companies
in which certain investors choose to commit capital, is illustrative of the
kinds of insight that can emerge from moving beyond traditional
shareholder categorizations.203 In his work, Professor Bushee identifies
three categories of institutional investors: (1) "transient" institutional
investors, who exhibit a high rate of portfolio turnover and hold a small
stake in portfolio companies; (2) "dedicated" investors, who take large
'
98Stewart, supra note 194 (internal quotations omitted).
200,d
201id
202See Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the "Right" Investors: Evidence on the
Behavior of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004); Juerg Vogt, The
Fight for Intrinsic Capital, IR MAG. (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.irmagazine.com/articles/shareholder-targeting-id/19354/fight-intrinsic-capital/;
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, (European Corp.
Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 200, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2227080; Robert N. Palter et al.,
Communicating with the Right Investors, in MCKINSEY ON FINANCE: THE ENDURING VALUE
OF FUNDAMENTALS, 40 McKINSEY&CO. 57, 58-59 (2011)
http://www.mckinsey.com/ClientService/CorporateFinance/Latest-thinking/McKinseyon
Finance/-/media/McKinsey/dotcom/clientservice/Corporate%20Finance/MoF/PDF%20issues
/MoFIssue 40 Summer0/201 1.ashx.203See generally Bushee, supra note 202, at 35 ("[C]hanges in disclosure practices
have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient
investors and toward more patient capital.").
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stakes in portfolio companies and exhibit more stable ownership
patterns; and (3) "quasi-indexers," which are institutions that also own
small stakes but exhibit infrequent trading behavior." According to
Professor Bushee, as might be expected, "[t]he disproportionate presence
of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify
pressure for short-term performance while also resulting in excess
volatility in the stock price."205
Similarly, the consulting firm McKinsey & Company classifies
shareholders in three categories-intrinsic investors, mechanical
investors, and traders.2"' For each of these classifications, McKinsey then
analyzes the trading behavior of shareholders along six axes-( 1) trading
characteristics; (2) percentage of total (publicly listed) U.S. equity; (3)
percentage of total trading volume in U.S. equity markets; (4) portfolio
concentration; (5) average holding period; and (6) average number of
portfolio positions monitored by analyst.207 The ultimate takeaway for
McKinsey is that management should "dedicate" its "engagement
efforts" to "intrinsic investors," which McKinsey defines as those
shareholders that "[s]upport the . . . management and strategy through
short-term volatility. "208
To summarize, identification techniques run the gamut from the
traditional to more contemporary and nuanced modes of analysis. At
base, such techniques seek to dissect and mine a company's shareholder
base to provide management with insight on shareholder behavior
patterns. This insight can reveal points of departure in shareholder
characteristics and behavior, which in turn allows for a more informed
approach to cultivation. From a cultivation standpoint, more nuanced
breakdowns of shareholder behavior like that of McKinsey's is helpful
because such analysis when mapped onto a company's shareholder base
reveals more sophisticated pathways for exploiting shareholder
heterogeneity to cultivate shareholder stewards.209
204Id. at 29.205id
206See Palter et al., supra note 202, at 58-59.
207Id. at 58-60.
208Id. at 59, 61.
209Several third-party market-intelligence firms exist that provide various analytical
models and tools to perform this sorting and identification function, and these firms often
interface with the corporation's investor relations department. See, e.g., Deal Making
Intelligence, THOMSON REUTERS, http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2014);
Press Release, Computershare, Computershare Analytics To Provide StreetSight.net Buy-side
Intelligence to Track Data's NewsWatch Users (Jun. 18, 2003), https://www-
us.computershare.com/Content/download.asp?docld=%7B6ElF40F7-AD89-4D52-9A3C-
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D. Tools for Recruiting and Re-Enforcing Shareholder Stewards
(Where the Rubber Hits the Road)
While identification and sorting primarily involve the firm's
investor-relations department, and in many cases one or more third-party
shareholder-relation firms, the enlisting and re-enforcing point on the
cultivation spectrum is where investor-relation functions, internal
corporate governance practices, the realities of today's capital markets,
and external law interact; hence, it is where the proverbial rubber hits the
road.210 The cultivation tools that a firm has in its artillery and is able to
deploy will depend on firm characteristics and the heterogeneous
characteristics of its shareholder base detected in the identification and
sorting prong, and such cultivation tools must be designed within
governing legal frameworks and against the practical backdrop of
modem share ownership.211
Enlisting and re-enforcing tools can be loosely classified into three
sub-categories, although among the three, there is some slippage and
overlap.212 The first sub-category includes organizational tools, which
engage organic documents such as bylaws and articles of incorporation,
and organizational frameworks, such as the laws of the state of
incorporation or stock exchange listing rules as cultivation tools.213 The
second sub-category consists of capital market tools, which leverage
financial securities products and processes to sort, recruit, and cultivate
shareholder stewards.214 Finally, the third sub-category can be loosely
defined as rhetorical tools, such as analyst calls and disclosure reports,
which utilize communication channels and points of interface not only to
speak to the entire shareholder base, but also to recognize the inherent
37783FC87689%7D&cc=CA&Iang=en&bhjs=0&fla=0&theme=cpu; What We Do, RIVEL
RESEARCH GROUP, http://www.rivel.com/about/1-about/1-what-we-do (last visited Jan. 11,
2014); About, RUDER FINN, http://www.ruderfinn.com/#/about/abouthome (last visited Jan. 11,
2014); Press Release, Edelman, Edelman Appoints Stephanie Smirnov New Managing
Director, Consumer Marketing in New York (July 11, 2013),
http://www.edelman.com/news/edelman-appoints-stephanie-smirnov-new-managing-director-
consumer-marketing-in-new-york/; Strategy Consulting & Research, FTI CONSULTING,
http://www.fticonsulting.com/services/strategic-communications/strategy-consulting-
research.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2014); Investor Targeting, IPREO,
http://www.ipreo.com/CorporateServices/Services/Americas/InvestorTargeting.html (last
visited Jan. I1, 2014).
2 10See infra Parts IV.D.1-3.
2 11See infra Parts IV.D.1-3.
212See infra Parts IV.D.1-3 (explaining three sub-categories of enlisting and re-
enforcing tools).
213See infra Part IV.D. I (explaining organization tools available to corporations).
214See infra Part IV.D.2 (examining capital market tools).
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heterogeneity in the base, to speak to current and potential shareholder
stewards.215
1. The Role of State of Incorporation, Stock Exchange Listings, and
Organic Documents in Defining Cultivation Zone
The choice of where to incorporate, whether to list on a particular
exchange, and the information included in a corporation's bylaws or
articles of incorporation, affect the default rules and immutable rules that
a company has at its disposal to cultivate shareholders.216 In turn, the
default rules and immutable rules to which a company is subject define
the outward bounds of cultivation opportunities and regulate acceptable
behavior within the zone of play.217
a. State ofIncorporation
A company's choice of state of incorporation affects the
topography of its cultivation zone.218 Different states provide different
legal frameworks, default rules, and a body of jurisprudence that affect
the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders.2 9 The state
of Delaware, for example, adopts an enabling framework that leaves
significant discretion to the board to inter alia, define the corporation's
mission and purpose, provide additional rights to the corporation's
shareholders (such as improved proxy access procedures), and determine
the rights of shareholders to call special shareholder meetings.220 In
contrast, consider California's corporate law framework, which is
generally deemed more shareholder-friendly than Delaware's, and which
among other things, has as a default rule that shareholders who are
"entitled to cast not less than 10 percent of the votes at the meeting" are
entitled to call a special shareholder meeting.221 Thus, a company's
election to incorporate in Delaware or California, or more broadly
215See infra Part IV.D.3 (examining rhetorical tools).216See infra Part IV.D.l.a-c (discussing how location of incorporation, listing on a
particular exchange, and the corporations bylaws and articles of incorporation affect the
default rules and immutable rules that a company has at its disposal).
217See supra Part Ill.C (examining how default rules and immutable rules define the
outward bounds of cultivation opportunities and regulate acceptable behavior within the zone
of play).
218See infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
219See infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
220See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2011).
22 1See CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(d) (West 2007).
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speaking, in one state over another, has practical implications for the way
in which power and rights are distributed between shareholders and the
board of directors, the limits on board action vis-A-vis shareholders,
which in turn impact the types of cultivation techniques that the firm can
employ. 222
Moreover, under the doctrine of internal affairs, which holds that
the law of the state of incorporation will govern internal disputes among
the directors, officers, and shareholders of the corporation, the choice of
state of incorporation has significant doctrinal implications. 223 Thus, the
state of incorporation affects the range of Shareholder Cultivation tools
that a company has at its disposal, 24 and relatedly it could affect how
potential investors view the company and whether they decide to invest
in the company's stock. 225 A new wrinkle is that with the advent of new
options for corporations to elect to become "social purpose" corporations
or "benefit corporations," the choice of state of incorporation is not all
that matters. 226 For corporations that opt to incorporate or that are already
incorporated in a state that now offers this social-purpose opt-in, the
decision on whether to opt into the social purpose/public benefit statutory
scheme will further serve a signaling function to potential investors and
may also hurt or enhance the corporation's ability to cultivate
shareholders.227
b. Choice of Stock Exchange
Similarly, a corporation's choice of stock exchange listing has
implications for the immutable-default rule construct and the types of
cultivation tools that it has at its disposal. 228 For example, consider the
222See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
223See, e.g., Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108,
1117-18 (Del. 2005) (explaining that under the internal affairs doctrine a company's state of
incorporation governs the choice of law to be applied in certain disputes).
224See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
225This is particularly true if vigorous competition develops among states for
incorporation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Lopatta, 'Virgin' North Dakota Draws Billionaire
Icahn in Raider Quest, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXgfseyKwJml ("The state has
adopted a law . . . that lets shareholders more easily gain control of any company incorporated
there.").
226See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-368 (2013); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
1704(b) (McKinney 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25 (West 2012).
227See supra text accompanying notes 223-26.
228See infra text accompanying notes 229-31 (showing how the choice of stock
exchange listing affects the immutable-default rule construction and types of cultivation tools
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case of two companies in the same industry-Hennes & Mauritz AB
(also known as "H&M") and Gap, Inc. ("Gap"). 229 H&M is a Swedish
company (with several hundred stores throughout the U.S.) whose stock
is listed on the Swedish stock exchange,230 but actively trades in the U.S.
on the OTC pink sheets.23' In contrast, Gap is a U.S. company whose
stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 232  Even
though both are public companies with a presence in the U.S. equity
markets, because of differences in stock exchange listing requirements,
H&M's shareholders are given a binding vote on executive compensation
matters under the newly enacted Swedish stock exchange listing rules,233
but Gap's shareholders do not have a binding vote on executive
compensation matters because neither NYSE listing rules nor U.S. law
requires it.234
The difference in the treatment of shareholder rights vis-A-vis
executive compensation could cut both ways. First, for a company that is
open to having a mandatory vote on executive compensation, a listing on
the NYSE versus the Swedish stock exchange allows them a chance to
distinguish themselves from competitors who are not so inclined and
perhaps signal to potential shareholders the importance of their voice and
vote on compensation matters.235 On the other hand, shareholders may
self-select and self-identify based on these differences, all things being
equal.236 In a similar vein, one could contrast differences in cultivation
that a company has at its disposal).
229H&M and Gap, Inc. both deal in the apparel industry. See H&M, ANNUAL REPORT
2012 (2013) ("The Group's business consists mainly of sales of clothing, accessories, footwear,
cosmetics and home textiles to consumers."); The Gap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(Mar. 26, 2013) ("Gap is ... one of the most iconic apparel brands in the marketplace today.").
2oSee H&M, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2013) ("The company's shares are listed on the
Stockholm stock exchange, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB.").
231See HMRZF Stock, OTCMARKETS.COM,
http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/HMRZF/company-info (last visited October 8, 2013)
(indicating H&M trades on OTC Pink Sheets).
232See The Gap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 26, 2013) (indicating Gap
Inc., is traded on the New York Stock Exchange).
233See Articles of Association, H&M (April 28, 2011),
http://about.hm.com/AboutSection/en/About/Corporate-Governance/Other/Articles-of-
Association.html#cm-menu (indicating that at the Annual General Meeting shareholders
determine the fees payable to the board of directors and the auditors).
234See The Gap, Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws of The Gap, Inc. (Form 8-K, Ex.
3(ii)) ("The salary, bonus, and long-term incentive compensation of all executive officers of
the Corporation . .. shall be fixed by the Board of Directors or a committee thereof from time
to time.").
235See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (noting how the Swedish stock
exchange requires a vote on executive compensation whereas the NYSE allows companies to
choose and therefore distinguish themselves from other NYSE companies).
236See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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strategy that arise between corporations listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq
and those listed on the London Stock Exchange. 237 As discussed below,
those in the former categories would be allowed under the exchange
listing requirements to issue up to twenty percent of stock in a private
transaction without the need for shareholder approval, while those in the
latter category would be allowed to issue no more than ten percent of
securities of an existing class.238 Thus, stock exchange listing
requirements potentially change the boundaries and the content of the
immutable-default rule construct, which in turn impacts the types of
cultivation tools that a firm can employ to attract and curate shareholder
stewards.
c. Organic Documents
Finally, in terms of organizational tools, a firm's articles of
incorporation and its bylaws serve key cultivation functions. Most state
corporate statutes provide a limited number of mandated requirements of
items that must be included in the corporation's charter or in its bylaws,
with wide latitude left to the corporation to tailor its organic documents
to its particular purpose and needs.239 For example, Delaware requires
that the certificate of incorporation include the name of the corporation;
the address of the registered office and name of the registered agent; the
nature and purpose of the business of the corporation; the number of
authorized shares; and the names and mailing addresses of the
incorporators.24 Beyond these four requirements, Delaware does not
dictate how the corporation may use its certificate of incorporation and
instead provides significant discretion to the board in the substance of the
provisions that it chooses to include.24' Similarly, Delaware's corporate
code does not specify the substance of what should be included in the
bylaws.242 Instead, the applicable provision of the statute simply states
that "[t]he by-laws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
2 37See infra Part IV.D.2.b (discussing listing limitations on the amount of shares that
can be sold in one private transaction without shareholder approval).
m'See infra Part IV.D.2.b.
239See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2011) (providing the minimum
requirements for the certificate of incorporation).
240See id. §102(a)(l)-(5).
241See id.
242See id § 109(b).
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rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.'"4
Thus, as cultivation tools, the organic documents provide for
corporations to among other things, define and in some cases, refine their
purpose; memorialize the corporation's governance processes and
aspirations; and specify the procedures for shareholder engagement.24
For existing corporations, this is particularly true with respect to the
bylaws, which in general can be amended by the board without the
consent of the shareholders, 245  as compared to the articles of
incorporation, which would require a shareholder vote for amendment.246
2. Capital Market Cultivation Tools
For Shareholder Cultivation, capital markets provide a forum for a
firm to connect to potential shareholder stewards through the use of
targeted financial tools and processes.247
a. IPOs
From the firm's perspective, going public represents a transition
from being surrounded by a core base of founders, initial investors,
venture capitalists, and employees who are hopefully supportive of the
firm's mission and value proposition, to being surrounded by a new
group of shareholders who may or may not support the firm's value
proposition.248 One way to smooth this transition and ensure some cohort
-
243DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2011). Case law does add some color by
specifying that the bylaws should serve a "process creating function" and should not be used
for substantive purposes. See Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 598 (N.Y. 1954).
244To avoid implicating the ultra vires doctrine, most corporations declare their
mission and purpose in a mission statement rather than in the certificate of incorporation. See
DAVID A. DREXLER, ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.05 (2011)
("Where the general language authorized by Section 102(a)(3) is utilized, the ultra vires
doctrine should be totally dead, even with respect to Section 124's three limited exceptions.").
245See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2011) (granting the board the power to
amend the corporation's bylaws without the consent of the shareholders).
246See, e.g., id. § 242 (providing that a vote of the shareholders is needed to amend a
corporations articles of incorporation).
247See infra Parts III.D.2.a-f.
248See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcoN. 243, 252-53 (1998)
(discussing the benefits provided by venture capital providers that would be lost or diminished
after the firm goes public); Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection
and Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of Private Equity's Advantages?, 76 U. CHI.
L. REv. 83, 87 (2009) ("[O]nce [a] startup becomes a public company .... [i]t begins to be
assumed that the public investors have different goals than the original backers.").
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of shareholders that will invest for the long run is to target shareholders
who do just that.249
The literature on initial public offerings ("IPO") suggests that in an
IPO, underwriters do sell some portion of the allotted shares by
allocation rather than by open auction.250 The idea behind selling shares
by allocation is to attract enough shareholders who will hold long-term
instead of quickly selling the stock and driving the stock price down.251
A stylized example of this occurred when Goldman Sachs went public in
1999.111 According to the Wall Street Journal, Goldman placed its shares
"with a group of institutional investors and rich individuals who
Goldman believed would remain loyal, long-term holders and not 'flip'
the stock after its opening."253
Goldman's IPO story also highlights that a company's choice to
utilize the "traditional" Wall Street allocation route during the IPO
process, as opposed to other legally sanctioned methods such as a
modified Dutch auction, may affect the company's ability to tailor its
shareholder base at the outset.254 In the case of Goldman, the company
was careful to allocate shares in a way that minimized the chances of
short-term "flippers" buying its stock.255 In contrast, when Google Inc.
went public in 2004, Google opted to sell its shares through a modified
Dutch auction where underwriters gathered bids from investors
irrespective of the investor's connection to the underwriters or the size of
249See Bharat A. Jain & Omesh Kini, Venture Capitalist Participation and the Post-
Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 593, 593,
600 (1995) ("[V]enture capitalists are typically active investors who try to add value to their
portfolio companies through ongoing longer-term involvement with continuing business
development[.]" (citation omitted)).
250See Anita Indira Anand, Is the Dutch Auction IPO a Good Idea?, II STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 232, 244 (2006) ("While the bookbuilt method can be criticized for giving rise the
practices of spinning [the underwriters' practice of allocating coveted IPO shares to existing
clients in return for higher commissions or future business.]"); Tim Jenkinson & Howard
Jones, IPO Pricing and Allocation: A Survey of the Views of Institutional Investors, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1477, 1493 (2009) (discussing alternative views of factors that influence allocation
in IPO).
25
'See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 250, at 1480 (stating that in determining
allocation, long-term shareholder status is considered a very important feature of investors).
252See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
253Charles Gasparino, Goldman IPO Lives Up to Expectations, Posts 33% Gain
in First Trading Day, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB925832942582883947.html.
254See Anand, supra note 250, at 245 (stating that a firm may choose the traditional
bookbuilt process rather than a Dutch auction in order to gain certain long-term benefits not
offered by the Dutch auction).
255Gasparino, supra note 253.
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their holding.256 While a modified Dutch auction approach is viewed as
"more fair" than the traditional allocation approach, in terms of a
cultivation tool, the allocation approach allows a company to maintain
more control over the initial construction of its shareholder base.257
b. The Twenty Percent Rule and Select Private Placements
The private placement of shares by already-public companies is
yet another cultivation tool that corporations can employ to attract and
recruit identified co-venturers. Both NYSE and Nasdaq rules allow
listed companies to sell up to twenty percent of a given class of securities
without shareholder approval and, in terms of SEC regulations, these
sales would typically fall under private placement exemptions and would
not require registration.258
The ability to sell up to twenty percent of a firm's equity without
triggering shareholder approval and without SEC registration (assuming
such issuance complies with applicable SEC rules and regulations)
essentially gives public corporations listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq the
leeway to cultivate at least twenty percent of their shareholder base to
secure a critical mass of shareholder stewards.259 When combined with
the identification and sorting techniques discussed above, corporations
effectively have twenty percent of their equity that they can control and
allot to shareholders who they have identified as co-venturers. This
twenty percent could be sold to one investor or to multiple investors who
exhibit investment behavior and characteristics attractive to the
corporation. Stated differently, this twenty percent could serve as a
stabilizing shareholder core committed to holding the corporation's
shares for some length of time. Such a stabilizing core also signals to the
256See Anand, supra note 250, at 240.
25 7See id. at 247-48.
258NYSE Market Rules: Listed Company Manual, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. § 3,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F I %5F4%5
Fl0&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F (last visited Nov. 8, 2013)
[hereinafter NYSE Manual] (requiring stockholder approval before a listed company can issue
twenty percent or more of its outstanding common stock or voting power); see also
Section 5600 Corporate Governance Requirements, NASDAQ STOCK MKT.,
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F
%5Fl%5F4%5F3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F (last visited
Nov. 8, 2013) (requiring that under certain circumstances, stockholder approval of transactions
that may result in the issuance or sale of twenty percent or more of a listed company's
outstanding common stock or voting power).
259See infra Part VI.A.1 for a discussion on critical mass.
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market and to other potential shareholders that the corporation has a
significant shareholder-supporter base on board who, colloquially
speaking, "has its back."
To use the previous, but admittedly somewhat extreme example of
Goldman Sachs and Warren Buffett, in 2008, Goldman needed a fresh
injection of capital and to steady the ship, so it sought out Buffett (who
has a reputation for being a steward).'60 Buffett agreed to invest up to $5
billion, in exchange for perpetual preferred stock.261' The arrangement
was beneficial to both parties because Goldman was able to secure
Buffett's support for management's strategy and ward off further attacks,
and for his part, Buffett was able to earn a handsome return on his
investments.262
Similarly, on a less grandiose level than the Goldman-Buffett
alliance, private equity funds are often brought in to invest in public
companies for similar reasons (referred to as "PIPE" investments or
private investment in public equity).263 Although private equity investors
are sometimes criticized for being "asset strippers," private equity can
play a tremendous role in the cultivation space.2" While private equity
firms have different investment strategies and focus, they all share the
common goal of investing with an eye to enhancing the value of the
company in which they have invested.265 In exchange for injecting
capital into a company, the private equity firm receives a stake in
ownership, along with one or more seats on the company's board, and
260Ben White, Deal Seen as Sign of Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at Al.
261id
262See generally id
263See generally John D. Hogboom, Private Investment in Public Equity:
An Overview, N.J. L. J., Aug. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor25 2006/hogoboominvest.pdf (discussing PIPE
investments).
264See Eileen Appelbaum, How Does Private Equity Really Make Money?,
ROOSEVELT INST., http://rooseveltinstitute.org/how-does-private-equity-really-make-money
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013); Davis, supra note 248, at 89.
265See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse ofPrivate Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 9 (2008) (internal citation omitted) ("[O]ver the past few years [private equity] has
become popularly associated with the buying out and taking private of public companies, with
the objective being to deliver superior risk-adjusted returns by improving the financial
performance and growth profile of the acquired companies."); Davis, supra note 248, at 87
(expressing that the primary goal common to venture capitalists is the continuing creation of
shareholder value); Trevor M. Gomberg, After the Storm: Unmasking Publicly-Traded Private
Equity Firms to Create Value Through Shareholder Democracy, 73 ALB. L. REv. 575, 577
(2010) ("The goal of private equity is to create value through investments in unproven or
mismanaged companies which likely need help in order to become profitable.").
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any rights or benefits included in the relevant acquisition agreement.26
In addition, the private equity firm has a vested interest in helping
company management successfully execute its strategic plan.267 Thus for
cultivation purposes, a private equity investor offers more rooted interest
than transient ownership.
c. Dual-Class Share Structures
Yet another capital market cultivation tool is the use of dual-class
share structures, where targeted shareholders may be given superior
voting and dividend rights. The most prevalent form of dual-class share
structure is the use of preferred stock.268 Dual-class shares structures
have a long history in corporate law and are explicitly recognized in state
corporate codes.269 To illustrate, the DGCL explicitly sanctions the use
of dual-class share structures and provides that a company may specify
such a structure in its certificate of incorporation.270 Corporations
maintain dual-class share structures for a variety of reasons,27' but these
types of arrangements can also be used as cultivation tools. For example,
when Facebook Inc. went public, it did so with a dual-class share
structure of Class A and Class B shares.272 Only the Class A shares were
offered in the IPO.273 The Class B Shares were sold separately to a
targeted group of shareholders, which consisted in part of the founder,
initial investors, and initial supporters.274 Facebook's Class A Shares and
Class B Shares are identical in all respects, except for voting rights and
conversion rights.275 According to Facebook's prospectus,
The rights of the holders of Class A common stock and
Class B common stock are identical, except with respect to
266Cheffins & Armour, supra note 265, at 9.
267See id.
268Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 863, 865
(1994) ("In most cases, the firm selects a capital structure that is characterized by a
combination of debt and equity, the equity portion typically consisting of one class of common
stock and one or more classes of preferred stock.").
269See generally id at 904-05.
2 7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2011).
271See Ashton, supra note 268, at 866.
2 72See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012).
273See Id
274 See id.; see also Steven M. Davidoff, A Big Bet on Zuckerberg, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 2,
2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/a-big-bet-on-zuckerberg/.
275See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012).
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voting and conversion. Each share of Class A common
stock is entitled to one vote per share. Each share of Class
B common stock is entitled to ten votes per share and is
convertible at any time into one share of Class A common
stock.276
The dual-class share structure is beneficial to Facebook's initial investors
because it helps them maintain control over the company's vision and
future trajectory after the IPO.277 Of course, this strategy by Facebook
was not without critique, but it is perfectly legal in terms of a cultivation
technique, and it does allow the firm to (a) maintain some control over its
decisions and strategic choices and (b) signal to the market that the firm
has a core group of shareholder stewards.278  Even for companies who
have been public for a long time, the dual-class share structure serves as
an enlistment tool to entice and reward targeted shareholders to become
owners in the firm.
d. Time-Weighted Voting
Another cultivation technique that firms have at their disposal is
the use of time-weighted voting, also known as tenured voting or time-
phased voting, whereby a shareholder's voting power increases based on
the length of time he or she has been a shareholder.280 Under state law,
tenured voting is generally permissible."' For example, in Williams v.
Geier, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board's decision to
276Id.
277See Davidoff, supra note 274 (exploring how Facebook's dual-class share structure
and voting agreements with other Class B shareholders enables Zuckerberg to retain control
over the company).
278See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, IS.S. Adds to Criticism of Facebook's
Governance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/i-s-s-adds-
to-criticism-of-facebooks-governance. Facebook's proposed governance plan signals to Class
A that its role is primarily financial capital contribution, and the locus of decision-making will
rest firmly with the board, the founder, and initial investors. See id
279See White, supra note 260.
2 oSee infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
281See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 60, at 1059 (explaining that under Delaware law,
corporations are not explicitly constrained in how they depart from the default one-vote-per-
share rule); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2011) ("[Unless otherwise provided in
the certificate of incorporation, each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of
capital stock.") (emphasis added). But see Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 n.82
(Del. Ch. 2007) ("The concept of time-weighted voting has been around for many years. The
DGCL does not embrace it.").
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award superior voting rights to long-term shareholders fell within the
ambit of a reasonable business decision and reasonable corporate
policy. 282
For companies listed on the NYSE, however, the stock exchange
listing requirements effectively prohibit companies from adopting
tenured voting once that company has issued stock with a certain
package of voting rights.283 The NYSE listing rules provide in relevant
part that:
Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded
common stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any
corporate action or issuance. Examples of such corporate
action or issuance include, but are not limited to, the
adoption of time phased voting plans, the adoption of
capped voting rights plans, the issuance of super voting
stock, or the issuance of stock with voting rights less than
the per share voting rights of the existing common stock
through an exchange offer.28
The NYSE standards thus effectively function as immutable rules and
bar the use of time-weighted voting for existing public companies.285
However, for non-public companies and companies about to go public,
tenured voting is a viable cultivation tool. In addition, even for listed
companies the NYSE has signaled in its interpretive documents that it
will allow some exceptions for corporate actions, which have a disparate
impact on stockholder voting rights if the exchange finds that these
actions have a "reasonable business justification."286 Examples of public
corporations that currently have a time-weighted voting policy include
Aflac Incorporated,287 J.M. Smucker Company,288 and Quaker Chemical
282See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376, 1382 (Del. 1996).
283See NYSE Manual, supra note 258, § 313.00(A).
284 d
285See id.
26Para. 313.00 Interpretation No. 95-01, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. (Jan. 10, 1995),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/pdf/votingrights.pdf.
287See Aflac Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 2 (May 6, 2013) ("In
accordance with the Company's Articles of Incorporation, shares of the Company's Common
Stock . . . are entitled to one vote per share until they have been held by the same beneficial
owner for a continuous period of greater than 48 months . . . at which time they become
entitled to 10 votes per share.").
288See The J.M. Smucker Co., Proxy Statement for the Annual Meeting of
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Corporation, although all three of these companies appear to have been
grandfathered in under the NYSE tenure voting rules.289
For Shareholder Cultivation, time-weighted voting allows
companies to distinguish among shareholders based on the shareholders'
level of commitment in owning the firm's stock. As a cultivation tool, it
rewards stewardship capital on one hand, and potentially discourages the
aforementioned flippers and short-term gamblers.290 Moreover, with
more attention being focused on the negative impacts caused by
shareholder short-termism and some shareholder activists,29' the NYSE's
ban on time-weighted voting may be ripe for reconsideration. In
articulating its policy to ban "time phased voting plans" and their ilk, the
NYSE does acknowledge in its listing manual that: "[t]he Exchange's
interpretations under [its voting rights policy] will be flexible,
recognizing that both the capital markets and the circumstances and
needs of listed companies change over time."292 With the growing
presence and clout of shareholder-gamblers in corporate governance and
corporate elections, there is a strong case to be made that for the NYSE
to re-evaluate its voting policy, which treats all shareholders as equal,
and "recogniz[e] that both the capital markets and the circumstances and
needs of listed companies [have] change[d] over time."293
Shareholders, (DEF 14A), at 75-76 (July 3, 2012). In general, common shareholders are
entitled to one vote per share but in the event that common shareholders have been beneficially
owned for approximately five years, then such common shareholders are entitled to ten votes
per share. Id at 76.
289See Quaker Chem. Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, (DEF 14A), at
A-i (Mar. 28, 2013) ("[H]olders of the Company's . .. Common Stock ... became entitled to
10 votes per share of Common Stock with respect to such shares, and any shares of Common
Stock acquired after the Effective Date, subject to certain exceptions.").
290See supra notes 149-51, 185-86, 255 and accompanying text.
291See Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should
Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93,
94 & n.160 (2010) (noting that empty voting undermines shareholder franchise); Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1267
(2008) (noting that intentional empty voting may lead to reduction of a company's value). But
see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLuM. L. REV. 863, 896-97 (2013)
(arguing that activist investors may prove beneficial to overall governance because they serve
a "governance arbitrageur" function). For a discussion of concerns about empty voting, see
Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, July 14, 2010.292NYSE Manual, supra note 258, § 313.00(A).
2931d
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e. Leveraging Current Shareholders
In addition to recruiting shareholder stewards, corporations also
leverage current shareholders as a cultivation tool to help shape the
views of the existing shareholder base. An example of this technique in
action is JPMorgan Chase's response to pressure by some shareholders
and their advisors to separate the roles of "chairman" and "chief
executive."294 In addition to publicly voicing its disagreement with the
proposal to split the posts, JPMorgan board members launched an
outreach campaign to its largest shareholders as well as to its smaller
shareholders whom the bank viewed as key allies in advocating its
views.295 One news report stated that, "[JPMorgan's] board members
[were] planning to sit down with some of the bank's biggest shareholders
to make their case that JPMorgan's . . . chief executive, Jamie Dimon,
should keep his chairman title . . . "29
As a cultivation strategy, the "sit down"297 with these shareholders
would be beneficial in at least two ways. First, if the targeted
shareholders agree with the board's judgment, the outreach could help
ensure that they cast their votes in support of management's
recommendations-increasing the chances of allowing management to
pursue JPMorgan's defined purpose and vision with Dimon in both
leadership roles. Second, the outreach to the targeted shareholders could
incentivize them to become active ambassadors and communicate the
reasons for management's decision to other shareholders from the firm's
point of view. This would likely educate more shareholders on the
benefits of management's position, which in turn, should also lead to the
goal of procuring more votes to maintain Dimon's dual leadership role.
In terms of the cultivation framework, the federal proxy rules and
Regulation FD would be examples of two immutable rules that would
form the outer boundaries of such outreach and determine the form and
scope of discussions."
294See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JP Morgan Works to Avert
Split of Chief and Chairman Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/behind-the-scenes-jpmorgan-works-to-sway-
shareholders-on-dimon-vote/.
295See id.
2961d
297 (d
298 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2011).
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f. Dividend Policy and Stock Splits
A firm's dividend policy and use of stock splits also provide a
means of cultivation, primarily by serving a signaling function to current
shareholders and the market, and thus potentially attracting shareholders
to buy or hold the company's stock. Both are in the discretion of the
corporation's board of directors and both may be used as a signaling tool
to indicate to the market that the company's future prospects seem
promising. Although dividends are in the discretion of the board,
payments have to comply with legal capital rules under state corporate
law.299 As discussed below, these state legal capital rules, which provide
both the method for calculating dividend payments and a cap on the
amount of dividends that can be paid, serve as markers for the immutable
rule boundaries that cannot be violated within the dividend space.3 00
Within these boundaries, however, corporate law default rules allow
boards a wide degree of discretion to determine how a firm's dividend
policy should be structured."o'
Similarly, stock splits may be used as a signaling function and
cultivation technique for firms who want to reward existing shareholders
or attract smaller investors into the firm's stock.302 In a stock split, the
firm increases the number of shares outstanding by issuing additional
shares to existing shareholders.30 Thus in a two-for-one stock split,
every shareholder with one stock is given one additional share.3" So if a
company had five million shares outstanding before the split, it would
have ten million shares outstanding after a two-for-one stock split."'
After a stock split, the firm's stock price will be reduced as a result of the
increase in the number of shares outstanding.306 In turn, one effect of this
is that the firm's stock appears more affordable to the market and more
attractive to smaller investors.307
299For example, in Delaware, the DGCL provides that dividends may be paid out of
surplus, which is defined as total assets less total liabilities, less paid in capital, or if there is no
surplus for a given year then dividends may be paid out of net profits for that year and/or from
net profits from the preceding year. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 170 (2011).
3
"See infra Part III.F.2.
301See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2011).
302See 3 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 20:20 (2d. ed. 2003).
303See id.
30See id.
305See id.
3 6See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 302, § 20:20.
30 See id.
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Whole Foods Market recently employed the stock split technique,
when it announced a two-for-one stock split in the spring of 2013.30' In
response to the announcement, Whole Foods stock price increased by
approximately eight percent the day after the announcement.' News
coverage of the Whole Foods stock split suggested that the split
primarily served a signaling function as to the company's future
prospects.3 " According to the Wall Street Journal, the split was "a way
for [the] company to signal [that] it thinks its future is bright." 3 1
Compared to other capital market cultivation tools, the use of
dividends and stock splits are arguably somewhat weak as cultivation
strategies because they do not involve targeting a particular group of
shareholders based on demonstrated or potential stewardship behavior.
Thus, while both the payment of dividends and the stock split
theoretically signal the growth prospects of the company, the problem is
that this signal is "noisy" as a cultivation strategy. The target recipients
for the message are not well defined or sorted to ensure that shareholders
who are enticed to buy the stock based on this information are in fact the
type of shareholders that the company would want to cultivate. In the
case of stock splits, however, this problem of untargeted recruiting goes
away if the target recipient is a small investor.312
30sJustin Lahart, Whole Foods Decides to Party Like It's 1999, WALL ST. J., May 9,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI00014241278873240597045784712428978723
54.
309Christopher Freeburn, Whole Foods Announces a 2-for-i Stock Split,
INVESTORPLACE, May 8, 2013, http://investorplace.com/2013/05/whole-foods-announces-a-2-
for-i -stock-split/.
3loSee Lahart, supra note 308.
31 id.3
'
21d. ("The thing is, the signal probably works best on individual investors.
Institutions are more interested in signals backed with cash, like share buybacks and dividend
increases. And since individual investors have retreated from direct ownership of stocks over
the past decade, the views of institutional investors are more important to companies."). The
article does, however, go on to note that splits may "still have value" because "[i]f a company
signals its faith in the future through a split, and then falters, it merely looks stupid." Id On
the other hand, if it signals its faith in the future through a share buyback or dividend payment,
"it not only looks stupid, [but] it has less cash to get through the rough patch." Id Another
concern is that because of discount brokers and fee structures, except for very expensive
stocks, splits may not make a company more appealing to the small individual investor.
Understanding Stock Splits-Factoring in Commissions, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Feb. 26, 20 10),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/01/072501.asp (stating that the increase in flat-fee
billing by brokers instead of traditional commissions has largely extinguished the advantage of
purchasing stock prior to a split for investors).
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3. Rhetorical Tools and Technique
A third category of action that companies engage in that is-or can
be-used as a cultivation technique is communicating with shareholders
and their other stakeholders. For shareholders, the primary methods or
points of communication include: the annual meeting; the company's
website; quarterly earnings guidance; sell-side analyst calls; shareholder
outreach; periodic reports; proxy statements; offering memoranda; press
releases; and most recently, communications via social media.' The
choice of communication channel, the invited group of participants, and
the substance of the message communicated, all provide a means for
management to reach, recruit, educate, and cultivate a targeted group of
shareholders, and curate an acceptable shareholder base.314
In the immutable-default rule construct, SEC rules and regulations
like Regulation FD and Rule 1 Ob-5, which govern the form, manner, and
substance of communications between the firm and its shareholders,
provide a framework and the outer limits within which a firm can
effectively formulate and deliver its message to shareholder
constituents.' In general, Regulation FD bans the "selective disclosure"
of material nonpublic information by mandating that an issuer who
discloses such information to investors or analysts disclose this
information to the general public."' For "intentional" selective
disclosures, disclosures to the public must be made simultaneously,
while for a "non-intentional" disclosure, the issuer must make a public
disclosure promptly.' Similarly, Rule 1Ob-5 makes it unlawful for any
person "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
3 13See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Says Social Media OK for
Company Announcements if Investors Are Alerted (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574.
3 14See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL.
L.REV. 821, 833-34 (2013).
"'l7 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2011); see also Litigation
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement,
Litigation Release No. 18438, (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8438.htm (discussing a settlement of enforcement
actions against twelve investment banking firms approved by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York).
316See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. For discussion of Regulation FD, see WILLIAM K.S.
WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 283-90 (Aspen Law & Bus. ed., 2nd prtg.
1996). For discussion of tipping by the company in violation of Rule 10b-5, see id. at 302-05.
"'l7 C.F.R. § 243.100. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 316, § 5.2.3[C][3]
(discussing that Regulation FD only applies to selective disclosure to certain categories of
person).
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state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.""'
Thus, Regulation FD is generally thought to regulate the process of
communication" 9 while Rule 10b-5 regulates the substance of the
communications.320 However, both still leave broad latitude for a firm to
shape and deliver its message.321
Some companies do realize the value to be gained from rhetorical
choice, the framing of their message, and message consistency.322 A lead
investor relations officer for a small-cap firm described it as the
importance of the "three Cs"-"consistency; credibility; clarity."323
Relatedly, in a recent research study published in the Harvard Business
Review, researchers "analyzed the transcripts of 70,042 earnings
conference calls held by 3,613 firms from 2002 to 2008" and found that
executives, who through their language conveyed short-termist views
(consistently used phrases such as "next quarter" and the "latter half of
this year"), attracted more short-term investors than companies whose
executives conveyed a long-term message to the market (with phrases
such as "years" and "long run").3 24 Based on these findings, the authors
concluded that:
Managers can take actions and structure their
communications to offset [short-term tendencies].
[Managers] should be aware that to a large degree, they are
setting the tone. The language a company uses when talking
to investors is a meaningful indicator of its orientation-and
the investors listening in on calls that emphasize a short-
31817 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2013).
'
19See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100.
320See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Some scholars believe that Regulation FD regulates
both process and substance, as does Rule 1 Ob-5. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 316, §
5.2.3[C][3].
321Excluding the SEC Form 8-K provision, neither statute defines how the
communications shall be delivered, only how they should not be delivered. See id; 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100.
322See Francois Brochet et al., Short-Termism: Don't Blame Investors, HARV. BUS.
REV., June 2012, available at http://hbr.org/2012/06/short-termism-dont-blame-investors/ar/1
(finding that companies that use words and phrases associated with short-term goals and
projections when communicating to current and prospective shareholders attract more short-
term-minded investors).323Telephone Interview with Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief Commc'ns
Officer, Wright Med. Grp. (Jan. 14, 2013).
324Brochet et al., supra note 322.
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term approach are a largely self-selecting group who like
what they hear.325
For Shareholder Cultivation, the implications are intriguing-knowing
the words or phrases that attract certain shareholders could enable a firm
to strategically employ language and rhetorical choices that maximize
cultivation efforts.326
In addition to language choice on earning calls, the choice of when
and how often to provide earnings guidance has cultivation implications.
While management's rhetorical choices could code and condition
shareholder expectations, so too could management's decision ex ante of
whether to even communicate. Although the law does not require
earnings calls, most public corporations provide earnings guidance in a
rote-like and ritualistic way because they view earnings calls as a
necessary part of investor relations.3 27 However, the purported benefits
of earnings calls such as enhanced shareholder returns are dubious.328 In
a 2006 report published by McKinsey&Company, the authors make the
case that quarterly earnings guidance may be a "misguided practice." 329
In the report, the authors note that:
Our analysis of the perceived benefits of issuing frequent
earnings guidance found no evidence that it affects valuation
multiples, improves shareholder returns, or reduces share
price volatility. The only significant effect we observed is
an increase in trading volumes when companies start issuing
guidance-an effect that would interest short-term investors
who trade on the news of such announcements but should be
of little concern to most managers . . . ."s
The report also found that companies who stopped giving quarterly
earnings guidance were not penalized by the market and the report
325
,d
326See generally LAKOFF, supra note 179; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 179, at
453.
327Peggy Hsieh et al., The Misguided Practice ofEarnings Guidance, MCKINsEY&CO.
(2006) http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/corporatefinance/the-misguidedpractice-of earni
ngsguidance.
3
"Id at Exhibit 2 (finding that there is no difference in returns to shareholders
between companies do not issue guidance and those that do).3291d at 1330id
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concluded that companies should "shift their focus away from short-term
performance and toward the drivers of long-term company health.. ..
Indeed several large corporations, such as Coca-Cola, Inc., 332 Motorola,
Inc., and Intel Inc.,34 have all stopped issuing earnings guidance. From
a cultivation perspective, the decision not to provide quarterly earnings
guidance is a decision to not pander to fair-weather shareholders who
oftentimes are not interested in performing a stewardship role in the firm.
E. De-Cultivation Tools
A necessary component in the Shareholder Cultivation process is
the "de-cultivation" of non-co-venturers and gamblers. For public
corporations, stopping unwanted investors from owning their stock is
nigh impossible and for obvious reasons much more difficult than
recruiting shareholder stewards to purchase the stock."' However, public
companies do have some de-cultivation techniques at their disposal.
1. Non-Engagement Techniques
On the softer end of the spectrum are "non-engagement"
techniques, which are actions by the company that signal to a particular
class of investors that the company does not wish to engage with them."'
These non-engagement techniques include soft tactics like not returning
an investor's phone call, not inviting an investor to meet with
management, and rebuffing any overtures by the would-be investor or
current shareholder to engage with management."
... Hsieh et al., supra note 327.
332See Earnings Guidance, ASPEN INST. 2 (Nov. 2007),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/EGInFocus.pdf
333See Hsieh et al., supra note 327.
334Id.
335See Marc Goedhart & Tim Koller, How to Attract Long-Term Investors: An
Interview with M&G's Aled Smith, McKiNSEY&CO. (June 2013),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/corporate-finance/howtoattractlong-
term investors an interview with m-and gs aled smith (discussing the challenge of
attracting quality, long-term investors).
336Telephone Interview with Julie Tracy, Senior Vice President and Chief Commc'ns
Officer, Wright Med. Grp. (Jan. 14, 2013).3371d
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2. Natural Inverse Techniques
Further along the spectrum of de-cultivation tools is the inverse of
several of the cultivation tools discussed above. For example, short-term
shareholders would receive diminished voting rights under a time-phased
voting plan, while a shareholder who attaches little value to sustainability
concerns (often short-handed as "ESG" or environmental, social, and
governance initiatives) would probably not be attracted to, or cultivated
by, a company who elected to become a "social purpose" corporation.
In addition, narrative and messaging could serve a de-cultivation.
function that encourages certain shareholders to exit the firm's stock. A
poignant example of this can be found in a statement made by Howard
Schultz, CEO of Starbucks, Inc., at the company's 2013 annual
meeting.38 When taken to task by a current shareholder about Starbucks'
support for gay marriage, Schultz sharply responded that "[n]ot every
decision is an economic decision" and that if the shareholder disagreed
with Starbucks' policy on gay marriage, the shareholder should "sell [his
or her] shares in Starbucks and buy shares in another company." 3
3. Share Repurchases
In terms of a more aggressive de-cultivation approach, the firm
could engage in share repurchases, also known as share buybacks or
stock buybacks.340 Under a share repurchase plan, management offers to
buy back some portion of the company's outstanding shares in exchange
for cash.34' The company either retires the repurchased shares or keeps
them as treasury stock for re-issuance.342 Under U.S. corporate law, there
338See Frederick E. Allen, Howard Schultz to Anti-Gay-Marriage Starbucks
Shareholder: 'You Can Sell Your Shares, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2013/03/22/howard-schultz-to-anti-gay-marriage-
starbucks-shareholder-you-can-sell-your-shares/ (reporting a conversation between Howard
Schultz and a Starbucks shareholder at Starbucks' annual meeting).
3391d. (quoting Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks).
3
oSee Dividends vs. Share Repurchases, DIvIDENDMONK.COM,
http://dividendmonk.com/dividends-vs-share-repurchases/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
341See Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders,
3 J. EcoN. PERSPS. 129, 129 (1989) (examining the effects on corporations when cash is
transferred to shareholders in return for the corporation's shares under a share repurchase
program).
34 2See B.S. Padmashree & N.S. Nigam, Buy Back of Shares by a Company: An
Analysis, 7 STUDENT ADvoc. 31, 31 (1995) (explaining that treasury stock is repurchased
shares that remain assets of the company and that share repurchases can lead to a reduction of
share capital thus an extinguishment of shares).
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are three primary means of conducting a share buy-back: open market
purchases; private negotiations; or block transactions.343 Share
repurchases are often conducted for financial reasons, such as increasing
a company's earnings per share.3" However, repurchases could
theoretically serve a de-cultivation function, especially when done
through private negotiati'ns. Selective repurchases are allowed under
U.S. law and thus the company could theoretically identify the
shareholders whose shares they wish to buy back. Realistically, the
problem will be the cost. For starters, there is evidence that share
repurchases are more financially beneficial to the company and more
successful with individual investors than institutional investors.345
Individual investors are more likely to jump at the opportunity to sell
their shares to the company when they perceive the stock to be
undervalued.34 On the contrary, as one might expect, institutional
investors are generally more financially savvy and sophisticated in their
decision-making and are not as easily swayed to relinquish their shares to
the company at the company's offered price. 347  Thus, for a company
whose de-cultivation is targeted at institutional investors, the use of share
repurchases as a de-cultivation tool could create substantial transaction
costs and become cost prohibitive.348
343See Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J.
CORP. L. 425, 426 & n.3 (noting the various methods of stock buybacks). Other methods of
conducting share repurchases include the use of repurchase put rights (whereby the holder of
the put has a right to sell their shares to the company at a certain price), fixed price tender
offer, and a Dutch auction tender offer. Id.
3
"Earnings per share, or "EPS", is calculated by dividing a company's retained
earnings by the number of shares outstanding. See, e.g., Thomas Boyd & Teresa M. Cortese-
Danile, A Better Understanding ofEarnings Per Share, 16 COM. LENDING REV. 58, 58 (2001)
(explaining the formula for computing earnings per share). Because share repurchases reduce
the denominator, the EPS figure increases. See id. at 59 (discussing how share repurchases
reduce the number of shares outstanding).
345See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34
J. CoRp. L. 409, 422 (2009) (discussing the difference between individual investors and
institutional investors).
346See id
347See id.
348See, e.g., Dividends vs. Share Repurchases, DIVIDENDMONK.COM,
http://dividendmonk.com/dividends-vs-share-repurchases/ (providing examples of companies,
such as Chubb, Costco, and National Presto Industries, who have announced share repurchase
plans) (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
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4. So Long! We're Going Private!
On the extreme end of the de-cultivation spectrum would be a
"going private" transaction,349 which would allow a public corporation to
cull its shareholder base, leaving in place only those shareholders who
management views as supportive of its mission and its long-term vision.
With respect to the legal framework, state law primarily focuses on the
fiduciary obligations of the board to shareholders while federal law
focuses on disclosure obligations."'0 When Dell, Inc. announced in early
February 2013 that it was going private, Michael Dell, the company's
CEO and founder, said that going private would "give the company
'more time, investment and patience' as it seeks to turn itself around."35 1
One news outlet expressed Dell's sentiment more pointedly, saying,
"Going private will ... give Dell the time and breathing room it needs,
without having to explain to impatient shareholders every quarter why it
hasn't built a better [sic] iPad."352 These statements by Michael Dell and
the media reflect the value of going private from a Shareholder
Cultivation perspective. Interestingly, going private transactions could
also be viewed as the ultimate cultivation tool because those taking the
349See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 302, § 23.04 ("[A] ... going-private transaction [is]
any organic corporate change, such as ... repurchase of shares . . . that results in a publicly
traded company being delisted or closely enough held so as no longer to be subject to the 1934
Exchange Act's reporting requirements."); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Governance in the Public
Corporation of the Future: The Battle for Control of Corporate Governance, 15 CHAP. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2011) (describing the relationship between federal securities laws, which focus on
disclosure obligations, and state law, which focuses on fiduciary duties of the board to
shareholders).
350See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986) (stating that the board owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders); see
also Brittany M. Giusini, Note, Pure Resources' "Fair Summary" Standard: Disclosures Away
From Obtaining Clarity in the M&A Context, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 595, 619-25 (2013)
(discussing the costs and benefits of increasing disclosure requirements in Delaware);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist Society's
Panelist Discussion Titled "Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act", 38 DEL. J. CORP. L.
453, 472 (2013) (discussing recent disclosure requirements under the JOBS Act).
35
'Dell Goes Private; Personal Computing, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2013, at 63; see also
Sharon Terlep, Facing Defeat, Michael Dell Tries One Last Gambit, WALL ST. J., July 25,
2013, at BI (discussing Michael Dell's current battle to save the company that he founded from
falling into the hands of activist investor Carl Icahn). The interesting question from a
cultivation perspective is whether Dell (the company) could have done anything ex ante to
further lessen the chances of Icahn succeeding in taking over Dell.352Ted Samson, Good-Bye PC Maker Dell and Hello Cloud Company Dell,
INFOWORLD (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.infoworld.com/t/cloud-computing/good-bye-pc-
maker-dell-and-hello-cloud-company-dell-212203.
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company private usually plan on playing a stewardship role in the newly
created entity. "'
F. Future Shareholder Cultivation Tools for Recruiting Shareholder
Stewards
Future cultivation tools contemplated in this Sub-Part all recognize
and exploit shareholder heterogeneity to encourage shareholder
stewards.354 Such future cultivation tools include: (1) nuanced financial
products like "MY Shares," which offer superior voting rights and
distribution rights to steward shareholders;" (2) time-weighted dividends
whose dividend stream is dependent on a shareholder's length of
ownership;... (3) mission-weighted dividends whose dividend stream
depends on the quality of share ownership;357 (4) suspending the rights of
shareholders who exhibit "improper" behavior in violation of corporate
law;358 (5) engaging regulatory agents such as stock exchanges and the
SEC to develop best practices around integrated reporting;' (6)
implementing a transaction tax on shareholders who exhibit non-co-
venturer behavior;6 . and (7) shareholder "rewards" point programs,
which reward shareholder stewards with points that may be applied to
additional shares or towards the purchase of the company's products or
services."' As developed below, each of these future cultivation tools
pattern the intent and design developed in Part IV-they act as gap fillers
within the immutable-default rules of corporate law to devise modes of
engagement and collaboration between shareholders and managers as a
third-way approach to improved governance design.362
3 53Going private does, however, entail significant costs, such as reduced liquidity and
marketability of the securities See Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public:
Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 7, 9 (2009) (noting that problems with going private include a reduction in financial
market liquidity and periods of depressed stock prices).
354See infra Part IV.F. 1-7.
.ssSee infra Part V.F. 1.
356See infra Part IV.F.2.
"'See infra Part IV.F.3.
3 5 See infra Part IV.F.4.
asee infra Part IV.F.5.
360see infra Part IV.F.6.
3 61See infra Part IV.F.7.
362See supra Part III.
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1. "MY" Shares
First, companies could elect to create a class of shares that reward
shareholders for being stewards of the company. These mission-yield
shares, which I shall call "MY Shares," could be created as a separate
class of shares similar to other dual class share structures. The MY
Shares could offer superior voting rights and economic rights, which
rights would be contingent not only on the length of ownership, but also
on fulfillment of the firm's mission-sustaining criteria.
In terms of designing such mission-sustaining criteria, the United
Kingdom ("UK") Stewardship Code... provides a helpful starting point.
"The UK Stewardship Code [attempts to] set[ ] out the principles of
effective stewardship by investors."" The Code highlights that
"stewardship is more than just voting" and extends to such "[a]ctivities
[like] monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as
strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance,
including culture and remuneration." 6 '
Thus a firm's mission-sustaining criteria could include a
combination of the following: (i) whether the shareholder constructively
engages with management on a continuous and proactive basis across a
range of matters such as "strategy, performance, risk, capital structure,
and corporate governance";3' (ii) whether the shareholder has remained a
continuous owner of the firm's stock for some minimum length of time
(for example, at least three years); and (iii) in the case of institutional
shareholders, whether the shareholder's internal remuneration policies
encourage portfolio managers to actively engage with portfolio
companies and invest for some minimum length of time. Interestingly,
firms could also devise their individual shareholder stewardship codes,
which could include broader principles and policy statements beyond
those contained in its mission-sustaining criteria. MY Share owners
could have the option of signing on to the firm's stewardship code, or
negotiating for a specific set of mission-sustaining criteria. MY Share
owners who fail to fulfill their agreed upon mission-sustaining criteria
would not be eligible to exercise their superior voting and economic
rights. Additionally, in the event that a firm distributed payment to a
MY Share owner based on the owner's superior economic rights and it
363The UK Stewardship Code, supra note 5.
31Id at 1.
365Id.
3
"Id. at 6.
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was determined ex post that the owner had not fulfilled agreed-upon
mission-sustaining criteria, the MY Shares could include a "claw back"
feature' 7 (similar to what is already being utilized in executive
compensation) that would allow the firm to recoup any unwarranted
payments."'
MY Shares would be distinct from so-called "loyalty shares"
because their superior rights would not be solely dependent on length of
ownership, but would also be dependent on fulfilling the aforementioned
mission-sustaining criteria.' Loyalty shares have gained greater traction
in Europe than in the U.S."' In France, for example, according to the
Financial Times, "it is common for companies to grant double voting
rights to ordinary shareholders who have registered for at least two
years.""' However, in the U.S., discourse surrounding loyalty shares has
increased. 2
In terms of substantive corporate law, MY Shares would be
permissible under state corporate law."' MY Shares leverage untapped
resources in corporate default rules regarding share ownership design,
while playing well within the outer boundaries of immutable rules.
367Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and
Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 236-38 (2013).
36 8The process and criteria for determining non-fulfillment or breach of the mission-
sustaining criteria would have to be negotiated and included in the governing contract. If the
contract was silent in this respect, then courts would employ traditional interpretive heuristics
such as trying to discern the parties' intent, if applicable allowing parole evidence, and drawing
on the doctrine of good faith. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903
A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006) (illustrating these concepts).
See COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT 206-14 (2013); see also Patrick Bolton &
Fridric Samara, L-Shares: Rewarding Long- Term Investors 10-12 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2188661.
370See Bolton & Samara, supra note 369, at 11-12.
37
'Alex Barker, Brussels Aims to Reward Investor Loyalty, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/167e60fc-6574-1 e2-8b03-00144feab49a.html#axzz2bGX
oU9nc. The widespread use of loyalty shares in France may be linked to the fact that in
contrast to the U.S. where share ownership is dispersed, in France share ownership tends to be
concentrated in block holders. See id.
372See, e.g., Jane Ambachtsheer, ROTMAN INT'L J. PENSION MGMT.,
http://www.rijpm.com/prereadingfiles/JaneAmbachtsheer Loyalty rewards groject 31 _M
ay.pdf (previewing an upcoming report on loyalty shares).
373See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2011); NY BANKING LAW §§ 5001-5002
(McKinney 2013); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1521-1522 (2013).
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For example, the DGCL provides that:
Every corporation may issue 1 or more classes of
stock . . . which classes or series may have such voting
powers . . . and such designations, preferences and relative,
participating, optional or other special rights, and
qualifications, limitations or restrictions . . . as shall be
stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation or of
any amendment thereto, or in [any] resolution . .. adopted
by the board . ... .
The DGCL further provides that:
Any of the voting powers, designations, preferences, rights
and qualifications, limitations or restrictions of any such
class or series of stock may be made dependent upon facts
ascertainable outside the certificate of incorporation or of
any amendment thereto, or outside [any] resolution . ...
The establishment of mission-sustaining criteria squarely falls within this
ambit. Exactly what constitutes mission-sustaining criteria would be at
each firm's discretion, but presumably would include such criteria as
holding for a certain length of time and supporting management's
initiatives that the investor in good faith reasonably determines would
fulfill the firm's enunciated goals in its mission statement or other similar
document."' One potential proxy for measuring the extent of a
shareholder's support for management's initiatives would be to track
whether the shareholder exits the stock in response to market news or
reactions.
Additionally, a board would be afforded wide latitude in designing
the contours of its MY Shares under the judge-made doctrine of the
business judgment rule, which creates a rebuttable presumption "that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.""' Absent a showing of waste,
374 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151.3751d.
17'See supra Part IV.
377See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (explaining the
business judgment rule under Delaware law); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 776 N.E.2d 776, 779 (111.
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illegality, or a lack of good faith, courts will generally not second guess a
board's business decision.' Moreover, the standard for proving waste
and lack of good faith is significantly high, which means that as a
practical matter, board business decisions that are otherwise legal will be
given protection by the courts.?" Thus, the design of MY Shares and
implementation of mission-sustaining criteria could be structured
squarely within the ambit of current corporate law.
To structurally implement MY Shares, the company would have to
make provisions for such shares in its articles of incorporation."o In
addition, MY Shares would be issued pursuant to a privately negotiated
agreement between the firm and the targeted investors. The agreement
could contain enforcement mechanisms that discourage the shareholder
from engaging in non-mission-sustaining activities and also discourage
the firm from straying from its mission or from retaliating against the
shareholder should that shareholder determine in good faith that an
initiative from management would not be in the best interests of the firm.
MY Shares could also be subject to restrictions on transfer, chief among
them being that they could not be sold without the firm's consent and that
the new holder would have to commit to satisfying the mission-
sustaining criteria. Alternatively, the rights that attach to the MY Shares
App. Ct. 1968) ("The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a
presumption that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of
the corporation they serve." (quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659
(Del. Ch. 1928))); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996) ("[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or
'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the
process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
interests.").
MSee Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984) ("It is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts." (internal citation
omitted)). One semi-counter to the courts' general deference is Zapata Corp v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 787-89 (Del. 1981), which directs a court to apply its own independent business
judgment to balance legitimate corporate claims if the board of directors satisfies its burden of
proof.
379See Smith, 488 A.2d at 873 (setting forth a standard of gross negligence).
380To the extent a firm's articles of incorporation need to be amended to provide for
MY Shares, this could prove challenging since existing shareholders have an immutable right
to vote on changes to the articles of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2011).
Existing shareholders may resist an amendment to allow for the issuance of My Shares since
such shares would potentially dilute their existing voting and economic rights. See, e.g.,
Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99-100 (Del. 2006) (explaining that a shareholder claim for a
breach of fiduciary duty may arise for "overpayment" or "over-issuance" when the existing
voting and economic rights are diluted).
2014] 849
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
could automatically terminate upon resale. MY Shares would be
structurally similar to other dual class share structures, and would be
based on many of the same rationales behind the use of founders' shares
and loyalty shares. MY Shares are, however, substantively distinct
because their superior voting rights and economic rights would be
subject to the shareholder fulfilling the enunciated mission-sustaining
criteria.
While I intend to develop the details of the MY Shares proposal in
future work, two significant drawbacks are worth noting. First, is that
developing a system to track and manage fulfillment of MY Shares
criteria would increase the transaction costs of steward stock ownership.
A potential counter to this is that as long as the net benefits accruing to
the firm and shareholders exceed the increase in transaction costs, such a
system would be worth contemplating.38' The second drawback is that
aesthetically MY Shares raise a disparate treatment problem. However,
one potential solution would be to use a warrant structure as proposed for
Loyalty-Shares whereby all shareholders would be issued the warrant,
but only those who fulfilled the mission-sustaining criteria would be able
to exercise the warrant and reap the benefits.382
2. Time-Weighted Dividends
A second cultivation tool would be the use of a time-weighted
dividend policy, whereby the amount of dividend due to each
shareholder would be dependent on how long that shareholder has owned
the firm's stock, as opposed to current dividend policies where a flat per
share dividend amount is paid to all shareholders irrespective of the
length of their ownership commitment to the firm."' Under a time-
weighted dividend policy a short-term shareholder (however defined)
would not receive the same per share dividend amount as a long-term
shareholder (however defined). The company would have the freedom
to elect where to draw the line between short-term and long-term holders,
and the ability to determine the proportional increase in dividends based
on length of share ownership. Dividend bump-ups could occur at set
time intervals (for example, one year, two years, three years, five years,
and beyond), or they could occur at shorter time intervals, or they could
'
8 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392, 394-95 (1937)
(describing the balancing of transaction costs and benefits by a firm).
382See Bolton & Samara, supra note 369.
383See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
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be based on a sliding scale. A dividend ceiling could be established so
that a shareholder would "top out" beyond some pre-established amount
(for example, five years), which would minimize the risk of discouraging
new shareholders from owning the company's stock. Time-weighted
dividends would be subject to the same general rules and practices that
apply to flat dividend payments, including the need to establish a
declaration date, record date, and ex-dividend date.3" Where time-
weighted dividends would differ from flat dividends is in the formula
used for calculation.
To illustrate, consider a Delaware corporation (which we shall call
"Figurative Firm A") that adopted a time-weighted dividend policy
which said that, "Should the company decide to declare a dividend, any
shareholder who is entitled to receive such dividend and who has
continuously held its shares for a year or more shall be entitled to a
dividend amount equal to the product of 1.5 times the declared dividend
amount." Thus, if after calculating the amount of dividends the company
could pay under the relevant sections of the DGCL, the company
determines that it will pay $2.00 per share, any eligible shareholder who
has met the time-weighted dividend ownership requirement of holding
continuously for a year or more, will be entitled to $3.00 per share ($2.00
x 1.5). The additional $1.00 per share represents the shareholder's
reward for fulfilling a stewardship commitment.
Legally, a time-weighted dividend policy would be permissible
under state law, federal law, and stock exchange listing rules."' Like
MY Shares, the decision to adopt a time-weighted dividend policy would
be protected by the business judgment rule and the existing immutable
and default rules surrounding dividend payments and dividend policies
would allow a board to implement a time-weighted dividend policy."'
Under state corporate law, the decision on whether to issue a
dividend is in the sole discretion of the board.' State law provides the
outer limits of the amount that may be declared as dividends, but still
leaves the directors with a wide swath of latitude to determine timing,
frequency, amount, and other specifications."' Most state statutes allow
dividends to be paid out of "surplus" and some states also permit the
payment of "nimble dividends," which are dividends paid out of current
384See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
385See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
386See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
387See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2011).
388See id.
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earnings.' The DGCL, for example, allows dividends to be paid out of
either surplus or current earnings and provides that "[t]he directors of
every corporation, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate
of incorporation, may declare and pay dividends upon the shares of its
capital stock[,]""o so long as the dividend payments are either paid out of
surplus39' or if there is no surplus, then the board may pay dividends "out
of its net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared
and/or the preceding fiscal year."392 The DGCL does not contain any
other substantive proscriptions on the declaration of dividends.
Moreover, the Delaware judiciary has repeatedly affirmed that a
company's dividend policy is within the discretion of its board of
directors and that the courts will not second-guess a board's decision
absent a showing of "fraud or gross abuse of discretion"."' With regard
to federal law and stock exchange listing rules, the relevant SEC rules
and regulations along with the relevant stock exchange listing
requirements address the procedural and disclosure requirements related
to dividends and do not regulate the substantive aspects of a company's
dividend policy. 394
In sum, time-weighted dividends provide an interesting cultivation
strategy with relatively minimal legal constraints and a broad zone of
play for a board to design such a policy.
3. Mission-Weighted Dividends
A third and related cultivation tool would be to tweak the time-
weighted dividend structure discussed above,9 so that dividend
payments not only vary based on length of holding, but on the quality of
38 See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONs LAW AND POLICY 226-38 (6th ed.
2007).
390DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a).
391Id. § 170(a)(1).
392Id. § 170(a)(2).
393See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d. 653, 658-59 (Del. Ch.
1975) ("The determination as to when and in what amounts a corporation may prudently
distribute its assets by way of dividends rests in the honest discretion of the directors in the
performance of [their] fiduciary duty. Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a
board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be
shown.") (internal citations omitted). See also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682
(Mich. 1919) ("The board of directors declare the dividends, and it is for the directors, and not
the stockholders, to determine whether or not a dividend shall be declared.").
394See NYSE Manual, supra note 258, § 204; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, 240, 249
(2013).
39
sSee supra Part IV.F.2.
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holding. Shareholders who exhibit some amount of stewardship
characteristics would receive superior dividend rewards as compared to a
non-co-venturer shareholder. I refer to these as "mission-weighted
dividends." A simplified example of how these mission-weighted
dividends could work is as follows: Imagine a company that cares about
having shareholders who exhibit stewardship characteristics."' Further
assume that this company has clearly defined these characteristics and
has come up with a list of mission-sustaining criteria.' Now let us
assume that the amount of dividends a shareholder receives will vary
depending on whether the shareholder satisfies all, or a substantial
portion, of the mission-sustaining criteria. Using the example above,398
assume Figurative Firm A had a mission-weighted dividend policy,
which provided that eligible shareholders who satisfy mission-sustaining
criteria, would be entitled to a dividend amount equal to two times any
declared dividend amount. Then, if the company declared a dividend of
$2.00 per share, shareholders who satisfied the mission-sustaining
criteria would receive a dividend of $4.00, with the additional $2.00
representing their reward for fulfilling the stated criteria.
While a mission-weighted dividend policy, like a time-weighted
dividend policy, would arguably fit within the bounds of corporate law's
framework and not infringe on any immutable rules,' the challenge will
be in the logistics of the design. For instance, measurement of whether a
shareholder fulfills certain mission-sustaining criteria will involve
developing objective proxies for assessing and quantifying the
shareholder's behavior. As in the case of MY Shares," this will increase
the transaction costs of the shareholder relationship, but if the benefits of
a mission-weighted dividend policy outweigh these costs, then such
mission-weighted design should be explored. In addition, the exercise of
assigning objective metrics to measure shareholder fulfillment of
mission-sustaining criteria is conceptually similar to the ongoing exercise
in the corporate sustainability space where firms and some third party
institutions have devised metrics to measure the strength of a
...See, e.g., The UK Stewardship Code, supra note 5 (providing examples of
shareholder stewardship characteristics).
397See, e.g., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES 3 (2000-11), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3. 1-Guidelines-
Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf (providing examples of sustainability reporting guidelines).
398See supra Part IV.F.2.
See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
400See supra Part IV.F.1.
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corporation's commitment to sustainability.401 Thus, while mission-
weighted dividend design may initially involve significant cost outlay, it
is not improbable and the initial cost outlay should be recouped over
time.
4. The Future of De-Cultivation: Suspend Voting Rights for the Worst
Case Offenders?
A fourth potential cultivation tool, which falls in the de-cultivation
category, would be to suspend the voting rights of shareholders who
overstep the role that law assigns to them qua shareholders. Admittedly,
this is a tricky suggestion, but there are other areas of corporate law
where courts do not allow shareholders to avail themselves of certain
shareholder rights when those shareholders exhibit behavior that the
court deems to be not in their "proper purpose" as shareholders or outside
the scope of a "proper subject" for shareholder action.402
For example, in the area of inspection rights, although all
shareholders have a right to inspect the corporate books and records,
shareholders who exhibit behavior that indicates to courts that those
shareholders may have an "improper purpose" in requesting inspection,
are barred from exercising their right of inspection." One could argue
that the suspension of shareholder rights based on a shareholder
exhibiting "improper" shareholder qualities is something that corporate
law already does, and this suspension technique could be extended to
voting rights. Stated differently, the "improper" conduct by the
shareholder is itself in violation of corporate law's immutable rules
regarding shareholder behavior and thus the suspension of voting rights
is simply a sanction (albeit, a steep one) to discourage such behavior.
In terms of existing law and immutable rules, a firm's unilateral
suspension of a shareholder's voting rights is significantly more dubious
than other cultivation tools, like MY Shares 4 4 or mission-weighted
40 1See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 397, at 2.
402There are many examples of cases involving inspection rights and shareholder
proposals. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, 909 A.2d 117, 118 (Del. 2006)
("[S]tockholders seeking inspection under section 220 [of the Delaware Code] must present
'some evidence' to suggest a 'credible basis' from which a court can infer that mismanagement,
waste or wrongdoing may have occurred."); Marathon Partners v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,
2004 WL 1728604, at *3-*4 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004) (explaining stockholder inspection rights
under Delaware law); Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1954) (discussing
shareholder proposal rights).
403See Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 125; Marathon, 2004 WL 1728604, at *3.
404See supra Part IV.F. 1.
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dividends405 for example, because corporate law views the shareholder
right to vote as sacrosanct.406 Thus, of all the cultivation techniques
discussed so far, the unilateral suspension of shareholder voting rights
comes the closest to skimming the immutable rule boundaries.
In Delaware, for example, a board is prohibited from using its
assigned powers to impinge on the shareholders' right to vote, in certain
circumstances.407 In Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., the Delaware
Court of Chancery wrote that "[t]he shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests."40 8 In Blasius and its progeny, the Delaware courts have repeatedly
held that a board cannot unilaterally act with "the primary purpose of
impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power" unless the board
demonstrates a "compelling justification for [its] action."409 Thus, for a
corporation incorporated in Delaware, suspending a shareholder's right to
vote would fall under the ambit of "impeding the exercise of stockholder
voting power" and would have to pass muster under Blasius.410
Why even contemplate vote suspension as a potential de-
cultivation technique? There are several reasons. First, it could be
argued that board action that infringes on a shareholder's right to vote is
not per se illegal so long as the board demonstrates that it had a
"compelling justification" for its action.411 One could envision an
argument that barring shareholders who the board can demonstrate
exhibit "improper" behavior-behavior that is potentially damaging to
corporate existence and policy-should count as a "compelling
justification" under Blasius.412 Second, it could be argued that in other
areas such as inspection rights, corporate law already limits when and
how shareholders can exercise their rights and the suspension of voting
rights is merely an extension of this history.413 Moreover, in light of how
some shareholders currently manipulate their position as shareholders to
extract private profit at the expense of the firm and other shareholders,
and abuse their right to vote by engaging in techniques such as empty
405See supra Part IV.F.2.
406See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
4 07See id. See also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 78-79 (Del. 1991) (applying the
Blasius "compelling justification" standard).
408See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
4091d. at 661.
41lid.
412See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
413See supra notes 408-10 and accompanying text.
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voting (which in a political construct is akin to committing voting fraud
at the polls),414 the suspension of voting rights to discourage damaging
shareholder behavior merits consideration by corporate policymakers.
5. Integrated Reporting
A fifth potential tool for cultivation would be for a company to
move to integrated reporting. Currently, the vast majority of U.S.
corporations provide standard annual reports and some elect to provide
so-called sustainability reports, in addition to the required standard
annual report.415 Not surprisingly, the companies that opt to produce
sustainability reports are the same companies that have taken
environmental or social initiatives, and wish to highlight this for the
market and signal their commitment to sustainability initiatives.416 A
handful of companies worldwide go one step further and elect to produce
integrated annual reports, which are reports that capture financial-as
well as environmental and social-performance.4 17
One of the first companies to move toward an integrated reporting
model was Natura, a Brazilian cosmetic and fragrance company that
implemented integrated reporting starting in fiscal year 2002.418 For
companies such as Natura that view sustainability as a core part of their
firm's mission and purpose, integrated reporting provides a clear signal to
the market about the company's commitment to environmental and social
concerns.419 For Natura, "integrated reporting [was] the best way to
414See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
415See, e.g., PEPSICO, INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.pepsico.com/download/PEP Annual Report 2012.pdf (dedicating a section of the
annual report to a discussion of human, environmental, and talent sustainability).
4 6See WENDY TNG, STRATEGIC SUSTAINABILITY CONSULTING, SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING AND SMES: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GRI, 1 (2010),
http://static.squarespace.com/static/4ffc3bale4b036a6lfbde6fflt/50cf68b5e4b0a7200de60c49/
1355770037036/White%2OPaperSustainability%/o2OReporting/o2Oand%20SMEs 052610.pdf
(pointing out that companies who report environmental and social initiatives do so to gain a
competitive edge).
417See SAMUEL A. DIPIAZZA JR. & ROBERT G. ECCLES, BUILDING PUBLIC TRUST:
THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE REPORTING 13 (2002); ROBERT G. ECCLES & MICHAEL P.
KRZUS, ONE REPORT: INTEGRATED REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY 3 (2010);
ROBERT G. ECCLES ET AL., THE VALUEREPORTINGTm REVOLUTION: MOVING BEYOND THE
EARNINGS GAME 5 (2001).
418See ECCLES & KRZUS, supra note 417, at 18-19.
419See id. at 21.
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signal its management's focus on environmental and social stewardship
and to ensure leadership's commitment to those goals."420
For cultivation purposes, integrated reporting could be used as a
signal to attract, recruit, educate, and keep shareholders whose
investment values include a focus on ESG issues.42' In terms of the role
of regulators in a new governance framework, integrated reporting is an
example of an area in corporate governance where regulators can play a
coordinating and norm-enforcing function.422 For example, South Africa
has recently mandated that all companies transition to using integrated
reports.423
In the U.S., integrated reporting is optional, and as a report by the
IRRC and the Sustainability Institute noted, it is a "partial reality."424 The
SEC has slowly been accreting sustainability and other ESG issues into
its reporting framework since the 1970s, but it has not done so in a
systematic way.425 For example, the SEC first began by promulgating
rules for disclosing environmental liabilities and contingencies as well as
material impacts of environmental laws and regulations.426 "More
recently, the SEC has addressed climate change, board diversity, mine
safety, conflict minerals, payments to governments by resource
extraction firms, and other sustainability topics in rulemakings and
guidance to companies for Form 10-Ks and proxy statements . . . .427
While the SEC has yet to explicitly adopt an integrated reporting
framework, the SEC's stance on sustainability issues would suggest that
integrated reporting would be allowed so long as it complied with the
420Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, The Performance Frontier: Innovating for a
Sustainable Strategy, HARV. Bus. REV., May 2013, at 50, 55.
421See Peter Ellsworth & Kirsten Snow Spalding, The 21st Century Investor: Ceres
Blueprint for Sustainable Investing, CERES 9 (June 2013),
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/the-2 1st-century-investor-ceres-blueprint-for-
sustainable-investing-summary (noting that companies that integrated sustainability principles
perform better, and produce superior returns over time).
422See id at 27 (suggesting governance principles are a key consideration in
shareholder voting).
423See Eric Hespenheide & Nick Main, Integrated Reporting: The New Big Picture,
DELOlTIE REV. 123, 127 (2012), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Deloitte%20Review/Deloitte%20Review%2010%2
0-%20Summer%202012/USdeloittereviewIntegrated-ReportingTheNewBigPicture_
Janl2.pdf
424See PETER DESIMONE, IRRC INST. & SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST., INTEGRATED
FINANCIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).
425See id.
426See id.
427See id.
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SEC's disclosure and reporting regulations.428 Thus, for firms that
actively wish to distinguish themselves from competitors and attract ESG
investors, switching to an integrated reporting model would aid in this
cultivation effort and would be allowed under current law.429 In addition,
several policy groups, most notably the International Integrated
Reporting Council ("IIRC"), the Global Reporting Index ("GRI"), and
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board ("SASB"), have
developed or are currently refining new frameworks and metrics to help
companies capture ESG issues and initiatives and report them in a
systematic and meaningful way.430 The first U.S. corporation to produce
an integrated report was United Technologies Corporation.431 Other U.S.
companies, such as Microsoft, have expressed interest in considering
such a model.432
428See JIM COBURN ET AL., DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES IN SEC
FILINGS: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES, ATTORNEYS & DIRECTORS 4-5 (2011)
(suggesting that the SEC released guidance as to public companies' obligatory disclosures to
investors). But see Bill Schneider, SEC Pushes-Pulls Back on Integrated Reporting,
INDUSTRY ISSUES (Sept. 10, 2012), http://industryissues.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/sec-
pushes-pulls-back-on-integrated-reporting/ (discussing how the SEC cannot decide whether it
supports the movement to integrate reporting).
429See, e.g., DELOITTE, INTEGRATED REPORTING: A BETTER VIEW? 3 (2011),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-MiddleEast/Local%20Assets/Documents/Services/
ERS/me ers integrated reporting septi l.pdf (indicating the vast amount of companies using
integrated reporting to attract investors).
430See generally IIRC Publishes 'Consultation Draft' on Integrated Reporting,
DELOITTE (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.iasplus.com/en/news/2013/04/iirc
(presenting draft framework and fundamental concepts for the integrated reporting process).
Similarly, the SASB "provides standards for use by publicly-listed corporations in the U.S. in
disclosing material sustainability issues for the benefit of investors and the public. SASB
standards are designed for disclosure in mandatory filings to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), such as the Form 10-K and 20-F." SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). For example, in 2013,
SASB developed a set of provisional sustainability standards for health care companies. See
SASB Releases Accounting Standards for Health Care, SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRIES (Aug. 4,
2013), available at http://www.sustainableindustries.com/articles/2013/08/sasb-releases-
sustainability-accounting-standards-health-care (announcing the release of provisional
standards for the health care sector).
43 1Robert Eccles, Get Ready: Mandated Integrated Reporting Is The Future of
Corporate Reporting, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Mar. 13, 2012, at 2, available at
http://sloanreview.mit.edularticle/get-ready-mandated-integrated-reporting-is-the-future-of-
corporate-reporting/.
432See Pilot Programme Business Network, INTEGRATED REPORTING (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.theiirc.org/companies-and-investors/pilot-programme-business-network/.
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6. Transaction Tax as Incentive for Stewardship
As others have suggested both in the U.S. and across the European
Union, one potential way to encourage more patient capital is for the
government to design tax policies that incentivize long-term share
ownership and stewardship behavior.433 For example, in the UK, much of
the focus has been on discouraging high-frequency traders who use
technology to trade short in rapid fits and bursts.434 The proposal on the
table is for the government to implement a financial transaction tax on
such trading activity.435 The proposal of a financial transaction tax did
not come out of nowhere. In a 1989 article published in the Journal of
Financial Services Research, economist Joseph Stieglitz argued that a
stock transfer tax could be used to increase overall efficiency in the
American economy by discouraging short-term speculative trading, and,
in a separate article also published in 1989, Lawrence Summers
contemplated the use of a securities transaction tax as a way to
discourage speculation in the market.436 Similarly, a 2009 report
prepared by the Business & Society Program of the Aspen Institute
articulated a related concept, which called for a revision to the "capital
gains tax provisions" or for the implementation of an "excise tax in ways
that are designed to discourage excessive share trading and encourage
longer-term share ownership."437 While the UK is further along than the
U.S. in implementing this type of tax incentive, as of the time of this
Article, efforts in the UK have been stalled as regulators continue to
work through the details of implementation and the policy implications
of a financial transaction tax.438
433John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision
Making: Final Report, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. 62 (July 23, 2012), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu actionplan20l3/documents/kayreview final report.pdf.
434See James McRitchie, Kay Review Recommendations, THE SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVIST, http://theshareholderactivist.com/corporate-governance/kay-review-
recommendations/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (reviewing several suggestions to promote long-
term investing).
435France Wants Changes to EU Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 5.
436See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3
J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 101, 101-02 (1989); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When
Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 J. FIN.
SERVS. RES. 261, 261-62 (1989). Special thanks to William Wang for urging me to consider
this literature.
437BOGLE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
4 38 Tom Fairless, Financial-Transaction Tax in Europe Hits Obstacles, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2013, at A8.
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Although the idea of a government-imposed transaction tax that
recognizes the heterogeneous nature of share ownership and is designed
to incentivize stewardship is not an example of cultivation vis-A-vis the
firm and its shareholders, it is yet another example of a role regulators
can and should play as suggested by the new governance literature-i.e.,
that of coordinator and re-enforcer of norms, in this case that of
stewardship.
7. Shareholder Rewards Points Program
Currently, a handful of corporations award shareholders with
"loyalty rewards" of extra dividends (as discussed under "Time-
Weighted Dividends"),439 additional voting rights, and warrants as
incentives to encourage long-term share ownership."o Two examples of
such corporations are L'Oreal Group and L'Air Liquide SA (both French
companies)."' Through these loyalty rewards programs, shareholders
who hold shares for a given length of time are rewarded for their
commitment."2 In the U.S., the use of such "loyalty rewards" represents
an untapped area for future Shareholder Cultivation efforts."
Going a step further, one can envision a loyalty rewards program
that is not limited to receiving additional shareholder rights, but which
also extends to rights to participate in other areas of the firm's enterprise.
Conceivably, loyalty rewards given to shareholder stewards could be
expanded to include awards of points that could be put towards the
purchase of the firm's products or services. In terms of design, a
shareholder loyalty rewards program that functions in this way would be
akin to such reward cards and points programs that companies already
use with their customers."4 As in the case of a customer rewards
program, terms and limits of use of these shareholder loyalty rewards
439See supra Part IV.F.2.
4 0 See Barry B. Burr, Mercer Seeks Long-Term Shareholder Rewards Program
from Corporations, PENSIONS & INVS. (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20121206/DAILYREG/ 21209930.
"'Id.
2 Id.
443Id. (according to Jane Ambachtsheer, "[o]utside of France" loyalty shares are a
relatively unknown concept (quoting Jane Ambactsheer, Mercer Partner)).
44See, e.g., Melissa Allison, Starbucks Moves Rewards Program
into Grocery Stores, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013,
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020600667_starbucksshareholdersxml.html
(discussing the reward-points program).
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could be specified by contract."' Designing such an expanded
shareholder loyalty rewards program would have the benefit of
deepening the shareholder's commitment to-and level of engagement
with-the firm.
In sum, Part IV provided a comprehensive analysis of a range of
current and future Shareholder Cultivation techniques that firms could
employ and where applicable, regulators could adopt, as a third-way
approach to governance design in light of shareholder heterogeneity." 6
V. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SHAREHOLDER CULTIVATION
The ability of public corporations to engage in ownership design
and actively cultivate some portion of their shareholder base is a
necessity in light of shareholder heterogeneity, and is a necessary step in
the direction of stewardship. In addition to providing a timely and
collaborative gap-filling response that forges a path from heterogeneity
to stewardship, Shareholder Cultivation has other practical and
theoretical advantages." However, like any endeavor, Shareholder
Cultivation has attendant costs and is subject to critique."' While the
specific benefits and costs of Shareholder Cultivation will differ from
firm to firm, the remainder of Part V highlights the key benefits and costs
created by this cultivation."
A. Potential Benefits ofShareholder Cultivation
1. Encourages Stewardship Capital
First, as a practical matter, Shareholder Cultivation gives firms an
opportunity to create a critical mass or stabilizing core of shareholder
stewards. According to one estimate, most companies view "a critical
mass of investors [as] being between 25% and 35% - although some
went as high as 50% - and in most cases they felt it was possible to
"
5See generally Sony Rewards: Terms and Conditions, SONY CORP. OF AM.
http://www.sonyrewards.com/en/footer/terms of use/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013);
Marriott Rewards Terms & Conditions, MARRIOTr INT'L, INC.,
http://www.marriott.com/rewards/terms/earning.mi (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing
examples of customer reward programs which have been specified in contract).
"
6 See supra Part IV.
"
7 See infra Part V.A.
"
8 See infra Part V.B.
"
9 See infra Parts V.A-B.
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have regular dialogues with between 10 and 20 investors who
represented that holding."450 For firms, having this critical mass is
beneficial because it provides executives with a stable group of
shareholder advisors and supporters who become especially important in
times of difficulty.45 For shareholders, having a critical mass of
shareholder stewards should lead to enhanced accountability on the part
of boards and managers.452
2. Mission-Sustaining
Second, Shareholder Cultivation serves a mission-sustaining
function in that it provides an approach to ensuring that the firm has a
shareholder polity that supports and advocates for its mission. This
mission-sustaining function of Shareholder Cultivation is critical for
corporations who view themselves more broadly than maximizing
shareholder value-the view that has long dominated corporate law
doctrine and its normative underpinnings, even though profit
maximization is not generally required by law.453 An example of one
such corporation is Patagonia, Inc. whose stated mission is to "[b]uild the
best products, cause no unnecessary harm, [and to] use business to
inspire and implement solutions to the environment crisis."454 In its
mission statement, Patagonia also states, "[w]e donate our time, services
and at least 1% of our sales to hundreds of grassroots environmental
450SKIPPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.451 d.
42I. at 9.
453Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also ALI
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1994) ("Subject to the provisions of
Subsection (b)[,] ... a corporation ... should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."). Subsection (b)
tempers this statement by stating that the corporation "[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations" and that it "[m]ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes." Id The profit maximization mindset
is probably best captured by Milton Friedman, who wrote more than forty years ago that the
"[a corporation has] one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits . . . ." Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970.
454 0ur Reason , for Being, PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=2047 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). Of
course there is an argument to be made that cultivation might not be necessary because
investors who are not interested in environmental responsibility would simply not buy
Patagonia's stock. This is true and it highlights the necessity of the "Narrative" cultivation
tools discussed in Part IV. See supra Part IV. Similarly, a company's mission statement can
and should serve a cultivation function. See supra Part IV.B.
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groups all over the world who work to help reverse the tide."455
Assuming that Patagonia is sincere in its mission and is not engaged in
"green washing,"456 Patagonia has an interest in ensuring that at least
some portion of its shareholder base is comprised of investors who share
the company's environmental sensibilities.457 Thus, for Patagonia, these
types of shareholders fall into the stewardship category.
3. Anti-takeover Devices
Third, Shareholder Cultivation buttresses the firm's chances of
withstanding a hostile takeover. Limits on the form and scope of anti-
takeover devices that management can employ are established by
corporate law's package of immutable and default rules. 4 8  Notably,
landmark cases like Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,45 Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc. 460 and Unitrin Inc. v. American
General Corp,461' as well as the recent case of Air Products & Chemicals,
Inc. v. Air Gas, Inc.,462 establish that management has significant leeway
in devising strategies to protect the firm from so-called "abusive tender
offer tactics."465  In turn, the private bar has devised, and courts have
blessed various anti-takeover measures, most notably the use of
shareholders' rights plans or "poison pills.""4  Shareholder Cultivation
455See PATAGONIA, supra note 454.
456
"Greenwashing" means "disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to
present an environmentally responsible public image. . . ." OXFORD DICTIONARY, Definition
of greenwash, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/greenwash (last
visited Sept. 3, 2013).
45 See PATAGONIA, supra note 454.
458See infra notes 459-60 and accompanying text.
459See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
460See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986).
46 1See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
462See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011).
463The counterargument to anti-takeover measures is well developed in the academic
literature and view hostile takeovers as providing "a useful device for disciplining corporate
management, managers themselves believe that vulnerability to hostile bids is a profound
weakness in the corporate governance structure because it exposes disaggregated and
disorganized shareholders to abusive tender offer tactics." WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER
KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 523 (3d ed. 2009) (noting, at the same time, that firm managers
need flexibility when devising strategies to protect the firm from inadequate tender offers).
46See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985); see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011) (permitting corporations to implement staggered
boards).
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provides a complementary defensive technique to such traditional
strategies. A critical mass of shareholder stewards potentially dissuades
hostile attacks, in addition to addressing the concern of "disaggregated
and disorganized shareholders."" Metaphorically speaking, while the
poison pill poisons the chances of a successful takeover,466 Shareholder
Cultivation fortifies the firm to endure a contest for control.
4. Financial Economics
From a financial economics perspective, Shareholder Cultivation
offers at least two advantages. First, outreach by the firm to targeted
steward shareholders will reduce the "set up costs" of such shareholders,
which in turn will reduce the firm's cost of capital and enhance the value
of the firm.467 The concept of "set up costs" was developed by Robert
Merton who noted that "[i]f an investor does not follow a particular firm,
then an earnings or other specific announcement about that firm is not
likely to cause that investor to take a position in the firm."468 According
to Merton, "for each firm, investors must pay a significant 'set up' (or
'receiver') cost before they can process detailed information released
from time to time about the firm .... "469
Shareholder Cultivation thus creates a bifurcated set-up cost
structure that lessens the set-up costs for potential stewards, but leaves
the set-up costs for non-co-venturers unchanged. Moreover, as discussed
by Edward Rock in Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation,
drawing on two seminal financial works by Yakov Amihud and Haim
Medelson which developed models for understanding the relationship
between firms and shareholders, the relationship between "the
shareholders of a company and its cost of capital" and thus "the identity
of the shareholders and their fit with the board of directors and the
managers . . . are potentially important to firm value."4 70 This
"
5 See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 463, at 523.
46 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986).
467See infra notes 468-69 and accompanying text.
"
8Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete
Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 489 (1987) (noting the concept of "set up costs").
469Id. at 489-90.
470Rock, supra note 14, at 851, 904 (noting the relationship between "the shareholders
of a company and its cost of capital" and the resulting importance to firm value); Merton,
supra note 468, at 487-509; see also Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and
the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. EcoN. 223, 223-47 (1986).
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observation that the composition of a firm's shareholder base will affect
its cost of capital applies with equal force to Shareholder Cultivation.
The second advantage from a financial economics perspective is
that private equity placements often result in "positive announcement
returns."47' This finding has been well-documented in the financial
literature and different rationales have been offered to justify this
finding, such as positive-price-effects evidence that changes in
ownership concentration better align the interests of owners and
managers, or private equity shareholders help to resolve asymmetric
information flows which in turn impact firm value.472 While the
underlying rationales for the market's response to PIPE investing remains
contested, the larger point for Shareholder Cultivation is that to the
extent a firm elects to use PIPE investing as a cultivation strategy, the
successful recruitment of a PIPE shareholder steward should generate
positive price reactions in the market.473
5. Enhance Thought-Partnerships & Monitoring Expertise
Successful Shareholder Cultivation will bring increased
knowledge and monitoring expertise from shareholders to the firm. The
financial economic literature is replete with findings of a connection
between block holdings and monitoring expertise.474 In sum, the
argument is that large block holders in a company's stock will have an
increased incentive to invest in monitoring activities that should be
beneficial to all shareholders, and in the governance construct, should
lessen agency concerns of manager's interests diverging from those of
shareholders.475
471See Indraneel Chakraborty & Nickolay Gantchev, Does Shareholder Coordination
Matter? Evidence from Private Placements, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 213-14 (2013) (discussing
the positive price reaction of private equity placements).
472See Karen H. Wruck & YiLin Wu, Relationships, Corporate Governance, and
Performance: Evidence from Private Placements of Common Stock, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 30, 32-33
(2009) (noting that private equity placements can attenuate information asymmetry); see also
Karen H. Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private
Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 12-15 (1989) (showing that private changes in
ownership can better align the interests of owners and managers and increase firm value).
473See supra Part IV.D.2.b for discussion on PIPE.
474See, e.g., Chakraborty & Gantchev, supra note 471, at 214 (comparing the
relationship between block holdings and monitoring expertise found in existing literature).
475See id at 228-29 (suggesting that PIPE managers have higher incentives to
maximize shareholder value); Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, Governance Through Trading
and Intervention: A Theory ofMultiple Blockholders, 24 REv. FIN. STUD. 2395, 2423 (2011).
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6. Recalibrates "Exit Voice Loyalty"
Shareholder Cultivation could theoretically recalibrate the
distribution of shareholders across Hirschman's classic "exit, voice and
loyalty" typology to better reflect the firm's ideal shareholder base.476
Hirschman conceptualized shareholder action in the face of "firm
decline" as falling into two categories: "exit" (i.e., sell their stock); and
"1voice" (i.e., engage with management and "voice" their opinions), with
a shareholder's degree of "loyalty" to the firm being the deciding factor
between whether a shareholder chose to exit or voice.477 Shareholder
Cultivation explicitly increases the voice and loyalty of shareholder
stewards and diminishes their desire to exit, while simultaneously
encouraging gamblers to exit the firm's stock. Of course, a fine and
careful line would need to be drawn between cultivating stewards
without alienating the rest of the shareholder base, or creating a barrier to
entry for future shareholders. One potential way to draw this line would
be to actively cultivate up until the point that a critical mass of stewards
is achieved (as discussed above), or for a firm whose concern is more
about long-term versus short-term shareholders, to actively cultivate up
until the point that the firm achieves its targeted turnover rate (as
previously discussed).478
7. Broader Societal Trend
Shareholder Cultivation converts share ownership from transient
to rooted, an effect that will become increasingly beneficial as more
computers rather than people pick stock.479 Moreover, this conversion of
transient to rooted parallels a broader sociological trend, which is an
emphasis on interconnectivity, community, and local specificity in the
face of technology and globalization.480 Examples of this trend include
476See generally ALBERT 0. HiRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4, 77 (1970) (describing the roles of exit,
voice, and loyalty on the part of shareholders).
4771d.
478See supra Part IV for turnover rate discussion. See supra Part IV.A. 1 for critical
mass discussion.
4790f course, people are behind the computer algorithms and thus, their preferences are
embedded in the algorithm. While this is true, once the algorithm is set and until it is adjusted,
it runs on auto pilot. See Popper, supra note 64 (explaining that Knight Capital Group lost
$440 million due to a computer glitch which led to rapid sell off of stocks last year).
480See infra notes 481-86 and accompanying text.
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the rise of the so-called "sharing economy" (like "car2go" 481
"Kickstarter" ,482 or "Airbnb"483); the Slow Money movement;4 1 the
renewed interests in the power of cities as the source of innovation and
solution;485  and local food movements such as "farm-to-table." 4 86
Shareholder Cultivation parallels these broader organizational patterns in
society and taps into a broader set of values that is beginning to emerge
in today's economy.
B. Potential Costs and Critiques
1. Increased Transaction Costs
A notable critique of Shareholder Cultivation is that it will
increase the transaction costs associated with share ownership.487 These
transaction costs include information-gathering costs as Shareholder
Cultivation requires that firms gather and sort through information about
shareholders to detect potential stewards;88 bargaining costs as
shareholder stewards and firms must now negotiate the terms of
481See Stephanie Steinberg & Bill Vlasic, Car-Sharing Services Grow, and Expand
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/business/car-
sharing-services-grow-and-expand-options.html (explaining that Car2go is one of about two
dozen car-sharing services in the U.S., renting only two-seat Smart cars and charging
customers by the minute instead of the hour).
482See Jenna Wortham, A Web Edge for Makers of Real Stuff N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/technology/2make.html (explaining that
Kickstarter is an American company providing tools to raise funds by crowd funding in
exchange for tangible rewards or experiences).
483See Susan Fournier et al., Learning to Play in the New "Share Economy", HARV.
BUS. REv., at 125, 128, 130, July-Aug., 2013 (quoting Marc McCabe, founder of Airbnb) ("In
the sharing economy, community is a bond around a common ideal."). See generally Thomas
L. Friedman, Welcome to the 'Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/friedman-welcome-to-the-sharing-
economy.html (explaining that Airbnb is an online service based in San Francisco which
provides a platform for individuals to rent unoccupied rooms and residences all over the world
to guests).
484Similarly, the Slow Money movement aims to "bring money back down to earth"
through "direct investments into farmers and businesses that make healthy food possible, at
relatively low rates of return." KELLY, supra note 68, at 197.
485See BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW
CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 2-4 (2013).
486Mario Batali, Mario Batali on Farm-to-Table Dining, GOTHAM MAG., May 10,
2013, http://gotham-magazine.com/dining/articles/back-to-basics.
487See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 45-46 & n.31, 114-16
(Univ. Chi. Press, 1988).
488See supra notes 210-11, 214 and accompanying text.
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stewardship engagement, including, if applicable, defining agreed upon
mission-sustaining criteria;4 89 and policing and enforcement costs, as now
both firms and shareholders need to monitor whether the other is keeping
up its end of the bargain.490
While the transaction costs associated with Shareholder
Cultivation would increase at the outset for each individual negotiation,
Shareholder Cultivation could also result in what Nobel Prize laureate,
Professor Oliver Williamson, terms transaction-cost-reducing
"governance structures."491 Williamson argues that transaction costs
depend on frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality, and
opportunistic behavior.492 One aspect of Williamson's work that is
particularly salient is that relationship-specific contracts are more cost-
reducing than repeated case-by-case bargaining.493 Williamson views an
advantage of the firm as providing a forum in which "owners of various
resources . . . commit[ ] to some 'contractual' governance
arrangement . .. in order to reduce their transaction costs and share the
resulting efficiency gains."494 Thus, while Shareholder Cultivation could
increase transaction costs at the outset, because it involves commitment
to a contractual governance arrangement, i.e., the stewardship
relationship, a plausible alternative is that Shareholder Cultivation
creates a transaction-cost-reducing relationship.
2. Entrenchment and Abuse
A second critique is that Shareholder Cultivation is subject to
abuse since cultivation runs the risk of creating (i) an entrenched board
and (ii) a powerful class of shareholders who have management's ear and
attention, which in turn could lead to management giving undue credence
to the will of these shareholders to the detriment of other shareholders.
One doctrinal solution to this concern would be to treat shareholder
stewards as similar to controlling shareholders, such that they would owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation and other shareholders if they exploit
their position to reap benefits at the exclusion of the other shareholders.495
489See supra Part IV.F. 1.
490See supra Part V.A.5.
4910LIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 41 (1985).
492Id. at 52, 56.
493Id. at 75-78.
494ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 463, at 9-10 (describing
Williamson's transaction cost theory of the firm).
495See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 705 (Del. 1983); In re John Q.
868 [Vol. 38
SHAREHOLDER CULTIVATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE
Like the fiduciary duties that attach to controlling shareholders, 496
fiduciary duties for stewards would become activated when such
shareholders are exercising their control. A breach of fiduciary duty
would only be found if the shareholder steward used its position to obtain
a benefit that other shareholders did not receive.497  The extension of
fiduciary duties to steward shareholders is similar to the proposal by
Professors Stout and Anabtawi to extend the controlling shareholder
fiduciary duty frame to activist shareholders.498
Similarly, another doctrinal solution to address the potential
problem of board entrenchment would be for courts to adopt an enhanced
duty of care standard similar to the standard adopted for judicial review
of board responses to takeover threats. 499 For example, in Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., in evaluating whether the board's decision to
pursue a selective exchange offer was entitled to business judgment rule
protection, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter [in the takeover
context] that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections
of the business judgment rule may be conferred."'
In light of this "omnipresent specter" that boards may be acting with the
"sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office" when
responding to a takeover threat, the Unocal court articulated an
intermediate standard of review, which required that the directors first
prove: (1) "that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger
Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613, at *17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009); Kahn
v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 1993 WL 290193, at *788 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993), reprinted in
19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 784 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994).
496See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1113-14 (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989) (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987))).
497See id To elaborate briefly, the alleged breach of a controlling shareholder's
fiduciary duties could be protected by sufficient procedural safeguards-for example, if the
transaction was recommended by a disinterested and independent special committee
functioning at an arm's length basis, and was approved by all of the minority shareholders in a
non-waivable vote. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981)
(describing the ability to delegate authority to a committee).
498See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 61, at 1260.
499Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
5001d
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to corporate policy and effectiveness existed"; and (2) that their response
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.""0 ' If the board satisfies
both prongs then their actions will be judged under the business
judgment rule.502 If, however, the board fails to satisfy the Unocal test,
the board's actions will be judged under the more exacting entire fairness
standard.0 ' The entrenchment concern, which animated the court in
Unocal and gave rise to the heightened intermediate review, is similar in
spirit to the entrenchment concern, which Shareholder Cultivation
presents. One way to deal with the concern of board entrenchment in the
cultivation context would be to adopt an enhanced standard of review
similar to the Unocal test.'0
Additionally, existing insider trading rules, which prohibit trading
on non-public information, provide an immutable boundary that would
deter shareholder stewards from abusing their stewardship status.0 '
While imposing fiduciary duties on shareholder stewards and treating
them as covered by insider trading rules may create a disincentive to
stewardship; shareholder stewards are compensated for this increased
risk by the superior economic rights, voting rights, and other terms that
they negotiate in exchange for stewardship."'
3. Institutional Investors May Pose a Problem
A third concern presented by Shareholder Cultivation is that its
chances of success are limited by the fact that the vast majority of shares
are held through institutional intermediaries, and these intermediaries
often have a business model or trading strategy that makes stewardship
incompatible.0 ' However, this concern may be misplaced as large
sId. at 954-55.502 1d. at 958.
5o3See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995) (citing
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.3d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)) (explaining that the entire fairness standard
applies once it has been determined that the business judgment rule is not applicable).
5 4Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
sosSee 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-l(a) (2013); see also 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2013) (requiring
an issuer, or an issuer's agent, to publicly disclose the intentional or accidental disclosure of
material nonpublic information to holders of the issuer's securities); 7 C.F.R. § 249 (2013)
(providing that Form 8-K should be used for "reports of nonpublic information required to be
disclosed" by § 243).
506See supra Part IV.D.2 (explaining various forms of possible stewardship
compensation including separate share classes with superior voting and economic rights as
well as time-weighted voting).
so'See, e.g., BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP.
GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE & COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
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institutional investors like BlackRock, Inc., the world's largest asset
manager, have openly expressed commitment to the concept of
stewardship."' Thus, institutional investors as a whole are not a lost
cause when it comes to stewardship.
One particular class of institutional investor that presents a more
interesting dilemma for Shareholder Cultivation is that of the index funds
whose stock portfolio is constructed to match or track a market index.
Since these investors are investing in an index, and not in a particular
stock per se, some executives view these funds as "automatically
incapable of being stewardship investors."5" On the contrary, according
to one report, index investors are interested in being stewards and are
"pivotal to the success of stewardship given their long-term commitment
to companies in their index."s"o This latter view seems more apropos
since index funds do hold for relatively longer periods of time and
continue to invest in the stock so long as the stock remains in the relevant
index.
One potential cultivation strategy that could be used for
institutional investors (including index funds) would be to devise a
reduced fee structure for institutional investors who commit to
stewardship."' In addition, for index funds, another point of leverage
may be to engage with the organization of which the fund is a part (since
several index funds are part of a larger institution with active holdings) to
encourage integration of stewardship behavior on an organization-wide
level.'
Thus, while Shareholder Cultivation has several advantages, its
practices, processes, and outcomes are not without critique. However, as
argued in Part V, existing doctrinal and market-based mechanisms can be
employed to effectively counter these critiques.' The ability to have
shareholders whose investment behavior and (in some cases) whose
PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? 29 (2011), http://www.ced.org/pdf/Are-
Institutional-Investors-Part-of-the-Problem-or-Part-of-the-Solution.pdf; (questioning whether
it is possible for an institutional investor, with short-term trading strategies, to step into a
stewardship role).
50 8See SKIPPER ET AL., supra note 9 (signifying BlackRock's commitment to investor
stewardship).
s"Id. at 7.
s old. at 9.
5 1 See HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 507, at 25 (providing a few examples of how
to convince institutional investors to support stewardship).
512See SKIPPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 10 (recommending institutional investors to
communicate internally about potential competing perspectives between different fund
managers).
...See supra Part V.A.1-7.
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moral compass meshes with the corporation's long-term mission, vision,
and purpose, is immensely beneficial to the specific corporation and to
society, and is necessary in today's equity markets with their
heterogeneous and transient shareholders.
VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholder Cultivation plays an important gap-filling role in
corporate governance, and should be allowed within the confines of
corporate law's immutable-default rule construct. It provides a third-way
approach for corporations to rewrite the terms of their engagement with
certain shareholders to cultivate stewardship partners in the face of gaps
between top-down corporate governance rules and changing dynamics of
share ownership. This is particularly important in today's economy as
public corporations face immense pressure to balance the competing
interests of shareholders and deliver long-term value.
The public corporate form is arguably one of the greatest
innovations for aggregating resources (in all of its dimensions-
financial, human, intellectual, and social), and using this combination to
generate profits, create employment, and develop products and services
that meaningfully impact and, in some cases, transform the way we
interact. Examples include the railroad, the automobile, and the iPhone.
However, public corporations are at an inflection point that presents an
opportunity for devising enhanced models and processes for conducting
business. Share ownership design and in particular, Shareholder
Cultivation, is a necessary part of this equation.
I believe that Shareholder Cultivation holds significant promise for
restructuring the way we think about corporate governance and the
necessary conditions for a sustainable public corporate form.
Shareholder Cultivation offers a new governance approach to corporate
governance that emphasizes connectivity and collaboration, and re-
conceptualizes existing business norms and practices to pivot towards a
new normal.
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